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Closure, though a term with great rhetoricalforce in the capital punishment
context, has to date evaded systematic analysis, instead becoming embroiled in
ideological controversy. For victims who have rubbed the rights lamp for years,
inclusion in capital proceedings and accompanying closure opportunities are
perceivedas aforce with the potentialto grantwishes ofpeace andfinality.Scholars,
however, arguefor rebottling the closure genie lest closure itselfprovefalse or its
pursuitviolate a defendant's constitutionalrights.In orderto effectively appraisethe
relationshipof closure to criminaljurisprudence,however, andthus to decide whether
andto what extent closure is an appropriateadjudicativegoal, it is necessary to more
thoroughly investigate the concept and develop a theory of closure. This Article
provides an argument against rebottling the closure genie, a task not only seriously
implausible but unsound underprinciples of communicative theory. Proposingthat
closure is an authentic cultural and communicative construct that has become
indelibly linked to capitalproceedings, this Article advocates a shift infocus to more
practicalquestions. This Articlefirst summarizes how legalscholarshiphas described
closure up to thispoint, andthen examines how courtsutilize the rhetoricof closureto
effect changefor victims 'families in a variety of contexts. It then reviews widespread
scholarly opposition to utilizing criminallaw to pursue therapeuticends. Thereafter,
this Article seeks to broaden the contemporaryunderstandingof closure by exploring
how members of one victim population-OklahomaCity bombingvictims 'familiesand
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survivors-have described closure in intensive face-to-face interviews. These
reflectionsprovide thefoundationfor theorizing closure as a communicative concept
composed of two interdependent behaviors: intervention and reflexivity. While
intervention is an interpersonalcomponent that urges victims 'families to take action
to effect change andpursueaccountability,reflexivity is an intrapersonalcomponent
that nudges them to contemplate andwork throughgrief emotion, and traumaafter a
loved one's murder. Finally, this Article considers the pragmatic ramifications of
applying a communicative theory of closure.
INTRODUCTION

For victims who have rubbed the rights lamp for years, inclusion in capital
proceedings and accompanying "closure"' opportunities are perceived as a force that
can grant wishes of peace and finality. Most scholars, however, argue for rebottling the
closure genie lest closure itself prove false or the pursuit of closure violate a
defendant's constitutional rights.
What exactly is "closure"? It is surely a multifaceted term, referring primarily to a
comforting or satisfying perception of finality. In the context of coping with a loved
one's death, closure can be derived from appropriately celebrating that life through
remembrance and mortuary rituals that can lay the dead to rest and assuage the loss for
the living. These gestures can lend a sense of finality to a (usually) troubling,
unsettling, or tragic event. It is no surprise that this form of closure has ancient roots.
In Homer's Odyssey, Odysseus's drunken companion, Elpenor, perishes in a fall from
the roof of Circe's house, and his body is left "unburied and unwept" after more urgent
tasks drive the intrepid adventurer onward. When Odysseus later encounters Elpenor's
restless shade in Hades, it implores the hero to remember him:
I beg you, master, to remember me then and not to sail away and forsake me
utterly nor leave me there unburied and unwept, in case I bring down the gods'
curse on you. So bum my body there with all the arms I possess, and raise a
mound for me on the shore of the grey sea, in memory of an unlucky man, so that
men yet unborn may learn my story.2
Time's passage, however, leaves few cultural constructs unchanged, and closure is
no exception. Talk of closure is ubiquitous in contemporary discourse. It has been
mentioned in conjunction with well-publicized murders3 and white collar crimes4 alike,

1. "Closure" is placed in quotation marks here to indicate that it is a term with a contested
meaning.
2. HOMER, THE ODYSsEy, Book 11, at 70-76 (E.V. Rieu trans., D.C.H. Rieu rev. trans.,
Penguin Books 2003).
3. See, e.g., Associated Press, Laci Peterson's Mother: "Closure Will Only Occur...
When IDie, "Dec. 23, 2004; B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Simpson Trial: Closure,butfor Whom?,
N.Y. TMEs, Jan. 26, 1997, at 10; Linda Loyd, Award Sends Message in Einhorn Case, PFULA.
INQUIRER, Aug. 1, 1999, at E03; Luz Villarreal & Fred Shuster, Browns, Goldmans Go Their
SeparateWays; For Families,There Is No 'Closure,' L.A. DAMLY NEWS, Feb. 11, 1997, at N3.
4. See, e.g., Gina Teel, Enron Whistle-Blower Finds Closure: Too Many Executives
Motivated by Their Stock Options, Says Sherron Watkins, VANCOUVER SUN, Oct. 31, 2006, at
D7; Today: Profile: Mixed Emotions in Houston over Kenneth Lay's Death (NBC television
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5
and has been sought by victims and their families on both national and international
stages, justifying initiation of war crimes prosecutions and truth and reconciliation
commissions. 6 Since 1991, when the United States Supreme Court ruled in Payne v.
Tennessee7 that states could permit murder victims' family members to deliver victim
impact testimony at sentencing, closure has become an especially popular topic in
criminal law, and new participative opportunities have been extended to victims'
families, symbolizing a shift in legal focus to more therapeutic ends.8 As crime victims
have gained political prominence, 9 they have carried their asserted need for closure
with them into the limelight.10 At the same time, justifications for punishment have
expanded from "deterring and incapacitating" offenders to the need to "reform,
educate, vindicate victims, produce catharsis, and express condemnation."'" Closure,
had a meteoric rise, both in the public consciousness and in the legal
then, "has
12

arena."'

Of particular interest is closure's relationship to capital punishment-the idea that
victims' families require an execution to heal. Before 1989, closure was never
mentioned by the media in conjunction with the death penalty; in that year, the terms were
used together once.' 3 Beginning in 1993, however, the degree to which closure was
identified with the death penalty grew exponentially, occurring 500 times in 2001,14 when
an ABC News/Washington Postpoll found that sixty percent of respondents strongly or
somewhat agreed with the statement that the death penalty was fair because it gave
closure to murder victims' family members.' 5 In the capital context, closure encompasses
not only the need for the victim's family to celebrate the victim's life through
traditional rituals, but also the desire to vindicate the victim through the criminal
broadcast July 6, 2006).
5. See, e.g., Roger Cohen, To His Death in Jail, Milosevic Exalted Image of Serb
Suffering, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, at 1; Derek Scally, Milosevic'sDeath "AGreatPityfor
Justice," IRISH TIMES, Mar. 13, 2006, at 10; Tom Walker, Milosevic Death CheatsHis Victims,
SUNDAY TIMES (London), Mar. 12, 2006, at 1; Olivia Ward, JusticeMaybe, but No Closure: The
Killers Can'tHear Their Victims, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 23, 2005, at Dl.
6. See generally MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998).
7. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
8. See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, Victims, "Closure," and the Sociologyof Emotion, 72 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Bandes, Sociology].
9. See, e.g., PrisonReform: Enhancingthe Effectiveness of Incarceration:Hearingon S.
3, S. 38, S. 400, S. 866, S. 930, and H.R. 667 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,104th
Cong. 1 (1995) ("[Pjunishment provides closure and peace of mind to victims ofcrime who too
often are forgotten by the criminal justice system.").
10. See DAviD GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 121 (2001) ("[V]ictims have become a favoured constituency and the
aim of serving victims has become part of the redefined mission of all criminal justice
agencies.").
11. Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal
Procedure: The Case ofAlford andNolo ContenderePleas,88 CORNELL L. REv. 1361, 1389
(2003).
12. Bandes, Sociology, supra note 8, at 1.

13.

FRANKLIN

(2003).
14. Id.

15. Id. at 61.

E. ZIMRING,

THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PuNisHMEw

48
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justice system by attaining a guilty verdict. This verdict not only marks the end of legal
proceedings and imposes accountability, but also confirms the victim's intrinsic worth
and human dignity and demonstrates the tragedy of loss, becoming a form of
remembrance. Many victims' family members believe that invoking the victim's name
in capital proceedings is not merely a tribute to the victim, but also is compelled by the
horrific nature of the crime. Scholars have noted that closure has wrought substantial
change in capital proceedings, becoming an independent justification for the death
penalty, victim impact testimony, and limiting procedural protections for condemned
defendants.1 6 Evidence of the impact of closure also extends beyond the courtroom.
After commuting the death sentences of all Illinois death row prisoners to life without
possibility of parole in 2003, Governor George Ryan reported that, in meetings with
17
victims' families, each family had pleaded for execution, citing a need for closure.
Closure is in many ways an attractive concept. It reflects the notion that legal
processes have socially constructive consequences beyond adjudication. It is a
convenient way to refer to a body of ambiguous but related concepts pertaining to
victims and their families: finality, catharsis, peace, relief, satisfaction, and a sense of
justice. Its widespread usage extends the hope of healing. Though its ease of use comes
from its ambiguity, these semantics also render it difficult to grasp in an empirical
8
sense. Thus, despite its popularity, many assert that closure is problematic.'
In grappling with closure, scholars have regarded the concept as Justice Stewart did
pornography, following an "I know it when I see it"' 19 approach, and have either made
tentative efforts at definition or briefly alluded to the term's diverse applications
without further explicating its multidimensionality. They have focused instead on

16. See Bandes, Sociology, supranote 8, at 26; Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure:
Forgiveness, Vengeance, and the Role of Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599, 1605

(2000) [hereinafter Bandes, Victims] ("Governor Jeb Bush of Florida, for example, in his current
campaign to truncate the death penalty appeals process in that state, has 'emphasized the
suffering of victims' families and complained that inmates spend about fourteen years on death
row before they are executed."'); Vik Kanwar, CapitalPunishmentas "Closure":The Limits of
a Victim-Centered Jurisprudence,27 N.Y.U. REv. LAW & SOC. CHANGE 215, 216 (2001)

("[T]he cultural production of a feeling of closure for the secondary victims has become, at least
implicitly, an independent justification for the retention and enforcement of the death penalty in
the United States.... [C]losure has become the central trope of the growing victim-centered
jurisprudence.").
17. George Ryan, Ill. Governor, Speech at the Northwestern University College of Law
(Jan. 11, 2003) (transcript available at http:/ www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid =
13&did=551).
18. Professors Armour and Umbreit state:
The notion of closure is rarely advanced by the survivors themselves. Many, if not
most, vehemently deny that there is closure or that closure will ever be possible for
them; they abhor the word because it implies "getting over it." Many survivors
also insist there can be no justice because nothing will bring their loved ones back.
Marilyn Peterson Armour &Mark S. Umbreit, The UltimatePenal Sanctionand "Closure "for
Survivors ofHomicide Victims, 91 MARQ. L. RE'. 381, 398 (2007); see also Peter Loge, The
Process of Healing and the Trial as Product: Incompatibility, Courts, and Murder Victim
FamilyMembers, in WouNDs THAT Do NOT BIND: VicTrM-BASED PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEATH

411,412 n.5 (James R. Acker & David R. Karp eds., 2006).
19. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
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closure's consequences-the inclusion of victims' families in criminal proceedings,
and particularly the incorporation of victim impact testimony in sentencing
proceedings. Some scholars assert that such activities offer powerful opportunities for
victim healing, 20 while others argue that they are means to therapeutic ends which legal
proceedings are ill-suited to effectuate in light of a criminal defendant's constitutional
rights.21 Yet, in order to effectively appraise the relationship of closure to criminal
jurisprudence, and thus to decide whether and to what extent closure is an appropriate
adjudicative goal, it is necessary to more thoroughly investigate the concept and
develop a theory of closure.
The time has come to assess closure in its own right, as a value-neutral
phenomenon. While closure may trigger strong personal reactions, it may also be
stripped of them. It is unduly simplistic to regard closure merely as an individual's
attempts to heal, or as a solely therapeutic concept. Closure is a process, not a
destination, a recursive series of adjustments that involves both intrapersonal and
interpersonal communicative aspects. This view of closure as a strategic, sense-making
process suggests that legal scholars and practitioners should not attempt to rebottle the
closure genie, a task not only seriously implausible but unsound under principles of
communicative theory. Demonstrating that closure is a real cultural and communicative
construct that has become indelibly linked to capital proceedings prompts a shift in
focus to more practical questions: What is closure in mainstream media culture and for
victims' families? Why is it a proper legal pursuit? How has it been integrated into
capital proceedings? How can it be achieved without violating defendants'
constitutional rights? The first three questions constitute the heart of this Article.
In Part I, this Article first summarizes how legal scholarship has described closure
up to this point, such as by using other amorphous phrases like "seeing justice done" or
the "closing of a chapter" or by adopting victims' own descriptions of closure without
providing further contextualization. It then examines how courts utilize the rhetoric of
closure to effect change for victims' families in three different contexts: procedural
concerns (interests in finality and preventing undue delay), preserving victims'
entitlements (interests in victim participation and in effecting a timely end to legal
proceedings), and accomplishing therapeutic goals (promoting healing, catharsis, and
control). Although closure can be used to describe the needs of those victimized by
diverse crimes, this Article will focus primarily on closure in the context of capital
murder. Having laid a foundational understanding of the semantics of closure, the
Article reviews why the vast majority of scholars are opposed to utilizing criminal law
to pursue therapeutic ends, and explains how existing scholarship confounds the
closure issue by (1) confusing efforts to conquer grief with attempts to regain a sense
of control and (2) failing to distinguish accouritability from vengeance.
In Part II, the Article seeks to broaden the contemporary understanding of closure
by exploring how members of one victim population--Oklahoma City bombing

20. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Transparency and Participationin Criminal
Procedure,81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 911 (2006).
21. See, e.g., Bandes, Sociology, supra note 8; Bandes, Victims, supranote 16; Wayne A.
Logan, Confronting Evil: Victims' Rights in an Age of Terror, 96 GEO. L.J. 721 (2008)
[hereinafter Logan, ConfrontingEvil]; Wayne A. Logan, Through the PastDarkly: A Survey of
the Uses andAbuses of Victim Impact Evidence in CapitalTrials, 41 ARIZ. L. REv. 143 (1999)
[hereinafter Logan, Through the PastDarkly].
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victims' families and survivors-have described closure in intensive face-to-face
interviews. Thereafter, in Part III, it elucidates a theory of closure as a communicative
concept composed of two interdependent behaviors: intervention and reflexivity. While
intervention is an interpersonal component that urges victims' families to take action to
effect change and pursue accountability, reflexivity is an intrapersonal component that
nudges them to contemplate and work through grief, emotion, and trauma after a loved
one's murder. Finally, in Part IV, the Article considers the pragmatic ramifications of
applying a communicative theory of closure.
I. EXISTING

PERSPECTIVES ON CLOSURE

A. ScholarlyAttempts to Define Closure

Several scholars have noted the need for a more comprehensive definition of
closure. 22 Significantly, psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers23-the very
individuals who one would expect to define the term-have failed to comment on the
term, except to say that closure is nonexistent for victim's family members. It does
24
indeed seem that "[c]losure is a term with no accepted psychological meaning.
Victim-turned-victim-advocate Deborah Spungen, however, states that closure is
synonymous with the attitude that victims should "get over it," that trauma and grief
are transitory and that a final resolution is possible. 25 While acknowledging that partial
resolution may be felt after various stages such as a suspect's arrest or the conclusion

22. See, e.g., Armour & Umbreit, supra note 18, at 421 ("The variety of reactions to
closure, some of which are contradictory, make it difficult to draw definitive conclusions about
the meaning of closure, degree of closure or the events that impact closure. The current literature
debates the existence and viability of closure or critiques its use as a tool of death penalty
proponents. What is missing is a direct examination of the survivors' experiences of ultimate
penal sanctions and the meaning, process, and function of closure."); see also Bandes, Victims,
supra note 16, at 1602 ("We might begin by examining the question: what do victims require in
order to achieve some measure of closure? Assertions about what victims need are often
presented as if they are empirically based. If this is indeed an empirical question about what
conditions are most likely to help, we ought to be looking for empirical answers, and there are
surprisingly few out there."); Peter Hodgkinson, CapitalPunishment:Meeting the Needs ofthe
Families of the Homicide Victim andthe Condemned,in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: STRATEGIES FOR
ABOLITION 332, 353-54 (Peter Hodgkinson & William A. Schabas eds., 2004) ("[T]he reason
generally offered by politicians and some victims' lobbies for witnessing an execution is that the
spectacle brings 'closure.' ... [Family members of victims who witness executions] in common
with most informed commentators were unclear as to what 'closure' is."); Margaret Vandiver,
The Death Penalty and the Familiesof Victims: An Overview of Research Issues, in WOUNDs
THAT Do NOT BIND: VICTIM-BASED PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEATH PENALTY 235, 235 (James R.

Acker & David R. Karp eds., 2006) (noting the paucity of research on closure after reviewing
the research on homicide survivors and the death penalty).
23. Clinical psychologist Therese Rando does use the term, however, stating, "the
survivors' mourning continues to be complicated by supplemental victimization and a torturous
lack of closure." TRERESE A. RANDO, TREATMENT OF COMPLICATED MOURNING 549 (1993).
24. Bandes, Sociology, supra note 8, at 1.
25. DEBORAH SPUNGEN, HOMICIDE: THE HIDDEN VICrIMS; A GUIDE FORPROFESSIONALS 239

(1998).
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of the trial, Spungen terms "total closure" illusory as that implies that victims' families
are unchanged and that the murder made no difference.26
Legal academics, however, have made a few definitional sallies. Attempts to define
closure parallel the growing use of the term. Thus, scholarship from the early- to mid1990s is most likely to speak of "grief' instead of closure, or is likely to equate closure
with grieving.27 Other scholars have noted that closure is a monstrously inclusive term,
with various references spouting hydra-like from its ambiguity. In surveying trends and
patterns in victims' media statements following execution, Gross and Matheson find
that closure is the most frequently mentioned issue28 and that it encompasses a wide
variety of ideas, including the idea of finality (putting the murder behind them),29
31
30
as a threatening presence,
termination of proceedings, the removal of the defendant
32
stage. 33
amorphous therapeutic terms such as "healing," and a conclusion to a life
Similarly, Bandes describes closure as "an unacknowledged umbrella term for a host of
loosely related and often empirically dubious concepts" which is often tied to legal
proceedings:
Closure is sometimes used to refer to the sense of catharsis that comes of speaking
publicly about one's loss.... Closure has also come to stand for the constellation
of feelings-peace, relief, a sense of justice, the ability to move on-that comes
with finality. The term sometimes refers to the ability to find answers to the

26. Id.

27. For instance, in 1998 Paul Rock questioned whether closure was possible for homicide
victim support group members, and also tied closure to grief:
[T]he precept that there can be a finish to grief is a subject of some ambivalence
amongst homicide survivors. It is resisted by many, but not all, active members of
the new organizations. [Support groups hold that closure is] a permanently bereft
state. To suggest otherwise, to impose an alien developmental programme that
proposes that one should "move on" or "get over it", is very often taken not only
to belittle the scale of their grief and invalidate their very special identity as deep
mourners, but also to betray the dead for whom they grieve.... [T]he need to
retain a memory prevents closure.
58-59
(1998). Kanwar does not interpret closure in the therapeutic context of grieving, but instead
asserts that closure has merged with a more vindictive term, the "satisfaction" that victims'
families may receive from obtaining a guilty verdict or witnessing an execution, and notes that
closure is a "relatively solemn and quasi-clinical" term. Kanwar, supra note 16, at 239.
28. Samuel R. Gross & Daniel J. Matheson, What They Say at the End: Capital Victims'
Families and the Press, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 486, 489 (2003).
29. Id. ("[T]he survivors say that they hope they will be able to put the murder behind them
or fear that they will never be able to do so.").
30. Id.at 490 ("[Flamily members expressed a clear desire for their ordeal to be over.").
31. Id.("In some cases, victims' relatives explain the relief they feel after the execution in
apparently concrete terms: Now the defendant is no longer a threat to them or to anybody
PAUL ROCK, AFTER HOMICIDE: PRACTICAL AND POLmCAL RESPONSES TO BEREAVEMENT

else.").
32. Id. at 491 ("More often, victims' families state their desire for a conclusion in abstract
or metaphorical terms. Some of the relatives say that now, with the execution behind them, they
can complete (or begin) the process of 'healing'.").
.33. Id.at 491-92 ("Family members frequently refer to the execution as a conclusion-the
end of a chapter, the end of a book, the closing of a door-rather than as a cure.").
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terrible questions a murder may leave open-for example, the circumstances of the
murder or the identity of the killer. This sort of closure might require solving an
open crime, but it might also involve some sort of interaction with the killer in an
of a sentence. In
attempt to learn more. It might require a verdict and imposition
34
the capital context, it might require a sentence of death.
Others assert that closure can involve intense desire or yearning3 5 and refer to the
cessation of suffering from pain and anger, peace from forgiving the murderer, a
reaction to learning previously unknown details of the crime,36 or catharsis.37 Armour
and Umbreit note that closure may be partial in the sense that suffering remains, and
distinguish various types of closure, such as judicial (i.e., "the end of survivors'
involvement with the criminal justice system"), emotional (i.e., "letting go of longstanding anger toward the murderer"), or psychological (i.e., "the completion of a final
act to honor the victim"). 38 Closure is also defined in the negative, indicating "that
what was taken can never be restored," "connot[ing] disappointment that the murderer
died too easily or to protest ...that another death caused by executing the murderer
could ever bring solace," and "signify[ing] the amount of vengefulness a survivor
feels., 39 Ultimately, Armour and Umbreit characterize closure as a term that is
"commonly presented as an end state and evaluated as a dichotomous variable due, in
part, to its use as part of a [pro-death penalty] political agenda" but assert that it may
more appropriately be thought of as a "continuum," so that one could speak of degrees
of closure.40
Scholars, then, regard closure as an emotional state4 ' (or a continuum of states, per
Umbreit). These descriptions of closure as an emotional state imply that those seeking
closure can comport themselves in a variety of manners, ranging from restrained
therapeutic grieving to intense, primal42 feelings of rage or vengeance. The spectrum of
closure behaviors, then, would seem to be bounded on one end by sadness or grief and
on the other by anger. Some explicitly assert that closure has more to do with anger or
vengeance than grieving.43 This anger in particular concerns scholars, who fear the

34. Bandes, Sociology, supra note 8, at 1-2.
35. Kanwar, supra note 16, at 216 ("[T]he ostensible finality of the execution itself is
invested with such extraordinary anticipation-a yearning for the irretrievable, a desire for the
unimaginable....").
36. Armour & Umbreit, supra note 18, at 417-18.
37. Kanwar, supra note 16, at 237 ("'Closure' and 'satisfaction' are twin notions of
catharsis that are reflected differently in the familiar markers of our culture.").
38. Armour & Umbreit, supranote 18, at 418.
39. Id.
40. Id.at418-19.
41. See, e.g., Bandes, Sociology, supra note 8; Bandes, Victims, supra note 16.
42. Kanwar, supra note 16, at 238 ("[Satisfaction] suggests a visceral craving, like the
insatiable desire for gratification or a 'fix."').
43. Id.at 239 ("[Rjemedies aimed at closure often partition off the emotional content that
drives them: rage, vengeance, and satisfaction."); id.at 240 ("According to retributivist Paul
Boudreaux, individual vengeance is the 'desire to punish a criminal because the individual gains
satisfaction from seeing or knowing that the person receives punishment.' This is the kind of
satisfaction that a victim is supposed to experience when she is allowed to view an execution or
influence a sentence.").
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punitive instinct that proffered closure threatens to release. As Arrigo and Williams
remark, "This punitive urge is not consistent with informed, reasoned, and reflective
judgments; instead, this tendency is reactive, responding to unconscious primitive fears
' 4
and dark affective undercurrents that are artifacts of the collective human psyche. "
Such assurances that "expressions of emotional intensity-whether in the form of lust,
grief, disgust, shame, or yearning-are regularly disqualified from legal discourse" rest
on the presumption that there is a strict divide between emotion and reason, with law
eschewing the former.45
B. The Use of Closure in Case Law
The extension of criminal law to effectuate closure for victims' families illustrates a
therapeutic orientation to law. Therapeutic jurisprudence "proposes the exploration of
ways in which, consistent with principles ofjustice and other constitutional values, the
knowledge, theories, and insights of the mental health and related disciplines can help
shape the development of the law." 46 It is premised upon the assumption that "[l]egal
rules, legal procedures, and the roles of legal actors (such as lawyers and judges)
intended or not, often produce therapeutic or
constitute social forces that, whether
47
antitherapeutic consequences.
A survey of the use of closure in case law shows that courts have not hesitated to
adopt its rhetoric. Ruling that the victim need not be a "faceless stranger, ' 48 the
Supreme Court noted in Payne v. Tennessee that murder "transforms a living person
with hopes, dreams, and fears into a corpse, thereby taking away all that is special and
unique about the person. The Constitution does not preclude a State from deciding to
give some of that back." 9 Justice Scalia, concurring, remarked that it was absurd that
"a crime's unanticipated consequences must be deemed 'irrelevant' to the sentence,"
and that the Court's former holdings "conflict[ed] with a public sense ofjustice keen
enough that it has found voice in a nationwide 'victims' rights' movement." 50
Judicial references to closure have occurred only recently in case law and may be
classified under three interrelated categories: (1) procedural concerns (interests in
finality and preventing undue delay), (2) victims' entitlements (interests in victim
participation and in effecting a timely end to legal proceedings), and (3) therapeutic
goals (promoting healing, catharsis, and control).

44. Bruce A. Arrigo & Christopher R. Williams, Victim Vices, Victim Voices, andImpact
Statements: On the Placeof Emotion and the Role of RestorativeJustice in CapitalSentencing,
49 CRiME &DELINQ. 603,613 (2003).
45. Kanwar, supra note 16, at 238.
46. Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudenceof TherapeuticJurisprudence,3 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 184, 185 (1997).
47. Id.
48. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
49. Id. at 832.
50. Id. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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1. Procedural Concerns
In mentioning closure in a procedural sense, judges express a felt need to move
proceedings along in a timely manner so as to comport with victims' entitlementswhat is thought to be "owed" to victims by the criminal justice system-and with
helping victims to "heal" as quickly as possible. Thus, this category overlaps to a large
extent with the other two, and these interrelationships are discussed below.
Finality is treated as an independent judicial interest. 51Activities such as learning
the whereabouts of a victim's body from the defendant,52 a defendant's confession,53
the attainment of a guilty plea, s4 enforcing a guilty plea, 55 and a conviction56 are
thought to effect closure for victims' families, and closure has even been used as
justification for DNA testing. 57 Closure is of course connected to the implementation of
a death sentence; as the Eleventh Circuit noted with respect to one defendant who had
been convicted over twenty years before the present action, "[c]ompelling interestse.g., guarding against a flood of requests, protecting the finality of convictions, and
58
ensuring closure for victims and survivors-support the State's position in this case."

51. Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1342 (1 lth Cir. 2006) (stating that "the government
has a strong interest in the finality of duly adjudicated criminal judgments"); see also State v.
Watts, 835 So. 2d 441, 453 (La. 2003) ("The finality ofjudgments is an important judicial and
societal goal. Those who have been victimized and the families of those who have been
victimized desire closure, especially in a brutal and senseless crime against an innocent
victim.").
52. In re Lawrence, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 537, 565 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Elkins finally revealed the
location of the victim's body some 10 months after the murder. By the time it was found, and
the victim's relatives received some closure, the body was partially eaten by animals.").
53. Winkles v. State, 894 So. 2d 842, 848 (Fla. 2005) ("Little weight was given to
appellant's having provided closure to the victims' families by confessing ...").
54. Robles v. Fischer, No. 05 Civ. 3232(JSR)(FM), 2008 WL 627509, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
22, 2008) ("Prior to imposing sentence, Justice Solomon noted that the negotiated plea provided
a level of certainty that a trial could not, as well as closure for the victims and their families.").
55. Patterson v. State, 660 So. 2d 966, 969 (Miss. 1995) (Lee, J., dissenting) ("Enforcing
agreements where the defendant pleads guilty to capital murder in exchange for a sentence of
life imprisonment not only promotes public policy, but also serves to preserve valuable judicial

resources and allows the family members of victims a certain degree of closure."), overruledby
Twillie v. State, 892 So. 2d 187, 190 (Miss. 2004).
56. United States v. Chong, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1136 n.1 (D. Haw. 2001) ("Moreover,
where a defendant's suicide results in vacating his conviction of committing murder, the
victim's family and friends are deprived of closure by a conviction.").
57. People v. Young, 850 N.E.2d 284, 303 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2006) ("The Garvincourt held that
the 'main purpose' for the collection of DNA was 'to absolve innocents, identify the guilty,
deter recidivism by identifying those at a high risk of reoffending, or bring closure to victims'
which it found distinct from 'traditional law enforcement practices designed to gather evidence
in a particular case to solve a specific crime that ha[d] already been committed."' (quoting
People v. Garvin, 847 N.E.2d 82, 92 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006))).
58. Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1342 (1 th Cir.2006) (emphasis in original); see also
Jones v. Allen, 485 F.3d 635, 641 (1lth Cir. 2007) ("If this court were to grant the motion to
stay to allow Jones to proceed on his § 1983 challenge in district court, the implementation of
the State's judgment would be delayed many months, if not years. Jones, in essence, would
receive a reprieve from his judgment.").
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2. Victims' Families' Entitlements
Judges can be somewhat protective of victims' family members, ensuring that they
receive what is essentially "due process"-timely adjudication of the suspect and the
opportunity to participate in proceedings. "Due process" for family members may be
contrasted with defendants' opportunities to appeal a conviction and sentence. In
Grayson v. King, for instance, the Eleventh Circuit stated that Grayson "has enjoyed
extensive judicial process over the years; indeed, it has been over twenty years since
his conviction, and he now seeks to forestall his death sentence by seeking further
process with minimal probable value."59 Family members also have other needs, such
as receiving information about the crime; as the court in State v. Poelking recognized,
"the commission of a crime for no reason at all can sometimes be the worst form of the
offense because the offender's actions go unexplained, leaving a victim without
closure." 60 Closure itselfmay even be an entitlement; one court faulted a defendant for
"refus[ing] to give closure to the victim's family, instead choosing to hide behind lies
set forth in his idle claims of innocence .... "61
Judges describe the family members' adjudicative interests as "strong," 62 and often
correlate those interests with the offender's timely trial and punishment. 63 One of the
strongest statements of this entitlement was made by the Arizona Supreme Court,
which stated, "[o]ne of the guarantees afforded by that [Arizona] constitutional
amendment is a 'prompt and final conclusion of the case after the conviction and
sentence.' We agree that if this provision is to have meaning, victims are entitled to
,6,4
in
closure much sooner than 25 or 30 years after their perpetrators' convictions. ....
Jones v. Allen, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
[n]ot only the State, but also the Nelson children, who watched Jones and his co-

defendant kill their parents and attack their grandmother and who themselves were

59. Grayson,460 F.3d at 1342.
60. No. 78697, 2002 WL 538767, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2002).
61. State v. Rimmer, No. W1999-00637-CCA-R3-DD, 2001 WL 567960, at *13 (Tenn.
Crim. App. May 25, 2001). The entire text of the statement is as follows:
Further, the Defendant showed no remorse at the trial or sentencing hearing, and
never revealed the location of the victim's body. The Defendant's refusal to
divulge the location of victim's body is callous in this court's opinion, and in
choosing to withhold such information, the Defendant has done much more than
commit murder in this case. Indeed, his refusal to divulge the location of the
victim's body effectively perpetrates on the victim's family a never-ending
victimization. The Defendant's refusal to give closure to the victim's family,
instead choosing to hide behind lies set forth in his idle claims of innocence,
obviously demonstrated to the jury the cold, heartless nature of the Defendant.

Id.
62. See, e.g., Jones v. Allen, 485 F.3d 635, 647 (11th Cir. 2007).
63. See, e.g., Bul v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 807 (3d Cir. 2000) ("We do not intend our
analysis to in any way detract from the noteworthy efforts of the trial judge to protect Buhl's
constitutional rights or to uphold the dignity of Buhl's victim, and afford her some measure of
closure by expeditiously bringing this matter to trial.").
64. State v. Richmond, 886 P.2d 1329, 1333 (Ariz. 1994) (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. II, §
2.1) (citation omitted).
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stabbed and shot, have a strong interest in seeing Jones's punishment exacted....
The State and the surviving victims have waited long enough for some closure to
these heinous crimes.65
Similarly, in Dickey v. Ayers, the court remarked, "[tihe State observes that 14 years
have already passed since Dickey was convicted, and unnecessary tolling would hinder
the ability of the victim's survivors to obtain timely closure and jeopardize society's
interest in swift punishment." 66 Finally, in Skaggs v. Commonwealth, the Kentucky
Supreme Court stated, "[s]urely the family and friends of the two victims are entitled to
some consideration as to the closure of these grisly and senseless murders-24 years
have passed. The legal process afforded the convicted killer has been much more than
67
due."
3. Therapeutic Goals
Judges believe that victim participation is an effective means to therapeutic ends,
and that legal proceedings can help victims heal or enhance closure prospects in ways
ranging from opportunities for victim impact statements 68 to punishing the offender. 69
Courts that have commented on victims' families' inclusion opine that such
involvement prevents victims and their needs from being overlooked by the criminal
justice system. Obtaining relatives' input on sentencing helps "further respect for the
law" by "enabl[ing] the court to have an idea of what someone in society who has been
forced to confront the issue deems a just punishment" and by "allow[ing] the victim to
70
realize that she is more than a mere spectator in the criminal justice process.
Similarly, the court in UnitedStates v. Blake stated of the effects of victim statements,
"[i]nstead of the victim feeling depersonalized and forgotten by the legal processes, she
can feel that her situation was properly understood and considered., 71 Finally,
restitution hearings have been described as proceedings that not only "inform the
court" but also "assure the victims (many of whom were unaware72of the workings of
the American justice system) that they were being treated fairly.,
Courts appear to place particular value on opportunities for victims' families to
make statements in legal proceedings; judges find that "[s]ound policy and practice, as
well as the need for consistent application of criminal law, mandate allowing crime
victims to be heard by the sentencing judge. 73 This principle is embedded in 18
U.S.C. § 3593,74 which states that victims must be given an opportunity to be heard in
capital cases, and information about the victim impact must be included in presentence

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Jones, 485 F.3d at 641.
No. Civ. F-06-357-AWI-P, 2006 WL 3359231, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2006).
No. 2002-SC-0436-MR, 2005 WL 2314073, at *5 (Ky. Sept. 25, 2005).
See, e.g., United States v. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d 328, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
Id.at351.
United States v. Cheung, 952 F. Supp. 148, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3593 (2006).
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reports as well under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(b)(4)(D). 75 At least one
federal court has attested to the healing benefits of victim impact testimony:
Victim impact statements may also serve as a catharsis for victims, helping to
assuage the bitterness at the fates that they have suffered. By participating in the
criminal proceeding, victims realize that they are recognized as important by the
court. The proceeding is not merely about the criminal, but it also accounts for the
person most affected by the crime. Simply76 giving this person a chance to speak
and be heard can have a beneficial effect.
Courts also recognize, however, that testifying can be traumatic for victims' family
members, disrupting closure. In State v. Smith, Justice Knoll ofthe Louisiana Supreme
Court considered such possible psychological ramifications in his concurrence,
concluding that it would be better for the judiciary and for the victim if a law
enforcement officer could testify rather than a family member:
[A] surviving victim's testimony could more easily present the risk of shifting the
jury's focus away from its primary function of determining the appropriate
sentence for this offense and this offender. Moreover, this overlooks the trauma
that a witness or surviving victim of a prior murder has suffered and the necessity
of bringing closure to these life shattering events. It would be unnecessarily harsh
with their lives
to require them to testify years later when they have moved on
77
when a law enforcement officer could serve the same purpose.
C. Opposition to the CurrentRole of Closure
The majority of scholars assert that pursuing closure for victims' families in capital
proceedings is a grievous error. Scholars have three main arguments against the
achievement of closure through legal proceedings: that law is ill-suited to fulfill
therapeutic needs, that legal forms of closure are not what victims actually need, and
that involving victims violates fundamental legal tenets.
Scholars have noted that there is a mismatch between therapeutic and legal ends.
Bandes, for instance, opposes the injection of therapeutic goals into criminal
adjudication, what she terms "a mapping of the language of private grief onto an
entirely different sort of emotion culture-collective, public, hierarchical, adversarial,
coercive., 78 Thus, Bandes notes, the question of what will fulfill victims' emotional
from the question of what legal proceedings can adequately
needs must be separated
79
provide to victims.
A related argument is that victims need other forms of closure than the law can
provide. Scholars are concerned that legal forms of closure are not the "therapeutic or

75. FED. R. C~im. P. 32(b)(4)(D).

76. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 351.
77. 793 So. 2d 1199, 1215 (La. 2001) (Knoll, J., concurring).
78. Bandes, Sociology, supra note 8, at 12.
79. Bandes, Victims, supra note 16, at 1603. According to Bandes, the law is already
breaking promises to victims' families that closure is possible and that it is attained through
legal proceedings. Bandes, Sociology, supra note 8, at 27.
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spiritual closure" that victims actually seek or require. 8 Law, after all, necessarily
entails certain forms of closure stemming from its need to seek accountability, and
pronounce a verdict. 81 But a legal proceeding is not a counseling session. Thus, it is
asserted that victims should turn to other extra-legal sources of support, such as
counselors, religious advisors, and friends and family that are not divided in their
loyalties towards both the defendant and the victims' relatives.8 2 Similarly, Kanwar
opines that closure requirements are so personal that it would be difficult to
incorporate any general steps to effect closure. This problem would only be aggravated
if a crime committed by a single defendant had multiple victims.8 3 Finally, a courtroom
place" that family members need "in which to articulate
may not be the "supportive
84
their pain and suffering."
Most of the criticism concerning victim participation in capital trials has centered
on its consequences for the objective conduct of the criminal trial-in short, on
"justice" for the defendant. Scholars have contended that seeking closure could have
serious adverse consequences for institutional and constitutional protocols and
values. 85 Thus, although victims must be treated with respect and allowed to voice their
disquiet, such opportunities must not be provided ifthey result in injustice,86 or if they
pose a danger to the rule of law.87 These and other concerns prompt scholars such as
Bandes to question whether healing victims' families is worth increasing the risk that
juries will impose death sentences arbitrarily. 88 Victims' closure requirements may be

hard to ascertain, and so it might be impossible to predict what legal steps are
necessary. 89 Finally, retrofitting capital proceedings for closure purposes may place
pressures on the legal system that it is not designed to withstand:
It exerts pressure on legislators to expand the list of death eligible crimes, or risk
showing disrespect for certain classes of victims. It exerts pressure on politicians
to "streamline" the capital system, for example by closing or truncating avenues of

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Bandes, Victims, supra note 16, at 1606.
Id.
Id. at 1605.
See Kanwar, supra note 16, at 245.
Arrigo & Williams, supra note 44, at 618-19.
See Kanwar, supra note 16, at 217.
See Arrigo & Williams, supra note 44, at 605.

87. See Kanwar, supra note 16, at 255.
88. Susan Bandes, Reply to PaulCassell: What We KnowAbout Victim Impact Statements,

1999 UTAH L. REv. 545, 552.
89. Bandes, Sociology, supra note 8, at 17. Bandes states:
If it refers to catharsis only, then perhaps the mere giving of a victim impact
statement is enough. If it is aided by information from the defendant about what
happened and why, a different set of questions is posed. In the courtroom, this
quest for answers might be reduced to watching the defendant's demeanor and
trying to read his reactions. If it requires a reaction from third parties, it becomes
important to clarify what sort of reaction is required, and from whom, and whether
it is the sort of reaction a capital trial can or should provide. If it requires a more
expeditious verdict, sentence, or execution, this raises a host of questions about
due process.
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appeal. It exerts pressure on prosecutors to bring capital charges, particularly in
high-profile cases, and even to resist reopening a case based on evidence tending
to exonerate the defendant. It exerts pressure on jurors to impose a death sentence.
It exerts pressure on judges to deny continuances or appeals. In general, it casts
closure as an entitlement the court is eager to protect and . . . procedural
90

safeguards, as well as grants of clemency, as cruel barriers to closure.

The angst that legal attempts to effect closure engenders among academics can
perhaps best be seen by examining the widespread scholarly consensus that victim
impact testimony does not belong in capital sentencing proceedings. Here, otherwise
"proper" emotions are held to be "improper" in capital proceedings, and their
exclusion necessitates the restriction or outright termination of victim participation
through impact testimony.
The argument against victim impact testimony exemplifies the three main
contentions against victim participation. Scholars who argue against victim impact
testimony frequently assert that law is not designed to effectuate the therapeutic ends
that victim impact testimony is thought to accomplish. Academics claim that victim
testimony does not comport with accepted penal justifications, and that it will result in
91
death sentences imposed by juries swayed by emotion and vengeful feelings. Others
mention the likelihood that prosecutors "may explicitly or implicitly communicate their
own views about what emotions are appropriate," and that these emotions--"anger and
92
vengeance"--might increase the chances of a death sentence. Researchers have also
suggested that delivering victim impact testimony is not healing, often after canvassing
victims' family members, prompting the conclusion that some victims do not feel better
after providing victim allocution. 93 Several authors who report a lack of satisfaction,
however, cite to a study by Davis and Smith,94 who analyzed the experiences of victims
95
who provided written victim impact statements, not oral allocution. Thus, this study
does not support the assertion that victim allocution is not healing. In actuality,
research on whether victim impact statements assist in closure is inconclusive; some
studies show increased satisfaction, others indicate decreased satisfaction, and still

90. Id. at 20-21.
91. Susan Bandes, Empathy,Narrative,and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Cm. L. REV.
361, 393-402 (1996) [hereinafter Bandes, Empathy]; Joseph L. Hoffinan, Revenge or Mercy?
Some Thoughts About Survivor Opinion Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
530, 533-34 (citing Ashley Paige Dugger, Note, Victim ImpactEvidence in CapitalSentencing:
A History of Incompatibility, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 375, 399-400 (1996)); Katie Long, Note,
Community Input at Sentencing: Victim's Right or Victim's Revenge?, 75 B.U. L. REv. 187,

222-23 (1995).
92. Bandes, Sociology, supra note 8, at 15.
93. Arrigo & Williams, supra note 44, at 604.
94. See, e.g., id. at 609.
95. Robert C. Davis & Barbara E. Smith, Victim ImpactStatements and Victim Satisfaction:
An Unfulfilled Promise?, 22 J. CRIM. JUST. 1 (1994). Davis and Smith concluded that "[tihe

results do not support the idea that victim impact statements are an effective means to promote
victim satisfaction with the justice system. There was no indication that impact statements led to
greater feelings of involvement, greater satisfaction with the justice process, or greater
satisfaction with dispositions." Id. at 10-11.
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others point to neither increased or decreased satisfaction.96 In addition, scholars
contend that the negative emotional effect of victim impact statements is at fault; such
statements, influenced by pain, anger, antipathy, and revenge, leave victims
dissatisfied.97 Other academics blame the trial forum, as its rituals and protocols
suppress authentic expressions of emotion. 98 Therefore, those who do not conform to
"stock" expectations about victimhood, such as by incorporating conventional themes
into their victim impact testimony,99 may face misunderstanding and hostility. 00
Finally, legal scholars assert that victim impact statements disrupt the balance of
capital proceedings, introducing arbitrariness into sentencing deliberations. Bandes
asserts that although one naturally sympathizes with victims, such testimony elicits not
only sympathy for the victim, but also legally unacceptable feelings ofbias, hatred, and
vengeance toward the defendant, distracting the jury from the defendant's unique
attributes and his culpability. I0 ' Other common criticisms are that juries base
sentencing decisions on the victim's characteristics, promoting inconsistency in
punishments; that the relative eloquence of victims' families unduly influences
defendants' fates; and that it may hurt family members to witness defense counsel
attempt to rebut the victim impact testimony. 02
II. FOUNDATIONS OF A COMMUNICATIVE THEORY OF CLOSURE

A. The EmotionalLandscape of Victims'Families
The emotional landscape of victims' family members is complicated. Traumatic
04
grief 03 is customary, resulting in part from the loss of a perceived "just world."'
Simply put, murder is disorder, and breeds further chaos.105 Common emotional
experiences include feelings of alienation and loss of control, simplification of moral

96. Edna Erez, Victim Participationin Sentencing: And the Debate Goes On..., 3 INT'L
REv. VICTIMOLOGY 17, 24 (1994).
97. Arrigo & Williams, supra note 44, at 609.
98. Bandes, Sociology, supranote 8, at 15.
99. See Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1411, 1432 (1993).
100. Bandes, Sociology, supra note 8, at 15.
101. Bandes, Empathy, supra note 91, at 395-96.
102. See, e.g., Hoffman, supranote 91, at 532-33.
103. According to Rando, complicated mourning arises from the nature of a homicidal
death-its suddenness, violence, trauma, horror, and preventability-as well as survivors'
feelings of anger, guilt, self-blame, and shattered assumptions. RANDO, supranote 23, at 8.
104. The "just world hypothesis" posits that "individuals have a need to believe that they live
in a world where people generally get what they deserve" in order to "confront [their] physical
and social environment as though they were stable and orderly" and "commit [themselves] to the
pursuit of long-range goals or even to the socially regulated behavior of day-to-day life." Melvin
J. Lerner & Dale T. Miller, Just WorldResearch andthe Attribution Process:Looking Back and
Ahead, 85 PSYCHOL. BuLL 1030, 1030 (1978).
105. As Rock notes: "Major bereavement is not calm, appraising, and rational. It is instead at

once a physical, emotional, and symbolic process that is built around a bewildering cacophony
of intense sensations that suffuses fields of experience." ROCK,supranote 27, at 40.

20101

"WHY REBOTTLE THE GENIE? "4

1493

"good" and "evil,"' 1 6 a need for information, and anger towards the
categories into
07
perpetrators.1

Survivors of traumatic events, including murder victims' family members, often feel
increasingly alienated in the wake of these events, and perceive that they are unable to
connect with the everyday world around them.'08 This pervasive helplessness and
loneliness may have physical manifestations, such as the inability to control behavior
(e.g., spontaneous weeping in "inappropriate" locales), or social forms (e.g., loss of
established routines and avoidance by former social acquaintances immediately after
Homicide also creates
the event or when victims fail to "bounce back" as expected). 109
0
a sense of unfinished business, with no final goodbyes or even last glimpses.1 Family
life
undertaking
key
for
members also experience a desperate need for information,
as
insofar
understanding
without
reconstruction. Because one cannot move forward
perpetrator
and
the
crime
about
possible the circumstances of the murder, information
is precious, and often is sought through trial attendance."' Finally, anger is of course
the prototypical family response, with family members' voices passionately demanding
a fitting punishment for the murderer. Anger is not only an emotion but also an activity
of "self-assertion and of accusation," constructing both the angry self and the object of
anger. 12 Anger is important because it motivates and orients family members towards
from anger,
a goal, encouraging them to once again assert control. Thus, in acting
113
experience.
anger
the
in
live
and
anger,
perform
families
victims'
In an effort to restore control and prevent future losses, family members may adopt
a practice of "keeping vigil" for the dead or other behaviors that maintain the traumatic
pitch of post-disaster life and fulfill needs to protest injustice, keep others safe from

106. As Rock notes:
In their fervour and sense of urgency, in their anger and bewilderment, most
survivors could have had no patience with anything but a simple and certain
morality, and they turned to unambiguous schemes that would subdue doubt,
establish firm boundaries between order and disorder, expel confusion, and point
to directions for action.
Id.at 101. Reconstructed moral schemas can sometimes have archetypal or mythic proportions;
Rock notes, "[i]t was as if on occasion survivors were recapitulating the plot of some very
ancient myth, moral disorder turning to order, flux to structure ..."Id.
107. See Jody Lyne6 Madeira, Blood Relations: Collective Memory, CulturalTrauma, and
the ProsecutionandExecution of Timothy McVeigh, 45 STUD.L. POL. & Soc. 75,86-87 (2008)
[hereinafter Madeira, Blood Relations].
108. Not only do survivors feel a "loss of interest in the world without the loved one," but
they also feel isolated from the "experience of frustration felt by others with the bereaved
person's continued suffering, [to the extent that this isolation] interferes with natural healing
processes." M. Katherine Shear, Allan Zuckoff, Nadine Melhem & Bonnie J. Gorscak, The
Syndrome of TraumaticGriefandIts Treatment, in PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF CATASTROPHIC
DISASTERS: GROUP APPROACHES TO TREATMENT 287, 327 (Leon A. Schein et al. eds., 2006).
109. See ROCK, supranote 27, at 31-42.
110. Seeid. at39.
111. As Rock notes: "Survivors thereby sought information, a restoration of control, and an
end to the marginality which magnified their feelings ofpowerlessness and kept them apart from
important sources of understanding." Id.at 99.

112. Id.at 101-02.
113. Id.at49.
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harm, resist loss of meaning, and remember and represent the dead or wounded."
Victims' families, then, are defined in opposition not to the deceased victim but to the
perpetrator, and each evolves its meaning from its relationship to the other.
Significantly, family members perceive this relationship as inequitable, with too much
consideration paid to the defendant and his rights.

B. A Case Study: Closure in the Context ofthe Oklahoma City Bombing
There is unique value in asking victims' families about the meaning of closure after
they have had time to reflect upon a murder and ensuing legal proceedings. Interviews
conducted by the author with twenty-seven victims' families and survivors of the
Oklahoma City bombing reveal definite trends and patterns in defining and negotiating
closure.1 5 When asked specifically to define closure, interviewees discussed what
forms of healing were possible, and aside from a few who specifically connected
McVeigh's conviction or execution to closure, did not discuss behaviors that
contributed to closure. However, other perceived needs that interviewees described,
such as a need to "complete" the process or to see justice done, are very much linked to
the pursuit of closure or reconstruction. Thus, interviewees used the term closure to
refer to therapeutic concepts such as "healing" or "coping" and also spoke of specific
activities that contributed to the healing process. Significantly, none of these activities
included therapeutic resources such as counseling. Individual participants are referred
to by random number instead of by name to preserve anonymity.
1. Closure as a Therapeutic State
Family members and survivors discussed two definitions of closure. In mass media
and popular culture, closure refers to a sense of absolute finality, or "getting over it,"
which interviewees assert does not exist. Closure can also denote coping with,
comprehending, or contextualizing murder; this form is possible to attain, however,
and many participants experienced it.
The pop-culture conception of closure as absolute finality has apparently poisoned
most family members' and survivors' opinion of the term; out oftwenty-seven victims'
families and survivors, twenty-two stated that closure never occurs. When asked what
closure meant to him, Participant 1 remarked, "I don't know because it never occurs. I
think things get better and get worse but there's, as long as a person's alive and they
116
have the state of mind that they can remember things, there's never closure."
Participant 14 gave a similar response: "I don't even know what that term means,
because.., there's not ever closure.... I think that you just learn how to deal with
it.,,11 7 Another interviewee hinted at the possibility of partial closure, stating

114. Melissa S. Wattenberg, William S. Unger, David W. Foy& Shirley M. Glynn, PresentCentered Supportive Group Therapyfor Trauma Survivors, in PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF
CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS: GROUP APPROACHES TO TREATMENT, supra note 108, at 505, 568.

115. The author conducted face-to-face interviews with twenty-seven victims' family
members and survivors of the bombing.
116. Interview with Participant No. 1, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (June 25, 2005).
117. Interview with Participant No. 14, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (July 16, 2005).
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[t]here is no such thing. That is a dirty word that should be stricken from grief
dictionaries... I mean you have closures on certain chapters ofthe event but total,
one.1 18
no.... I don't know who came up with that word but it's not a very good
It was common to remark that closure would only come with death; as Participant 10
' 19
stated, "Ihate the word closure... there won't be closure till I am dead." Participant
18 would define closure as the comfort of knowing that a loved one was alive:
[H]ow can I terminate or end the pain that goes along with how you miss that
person.... That's what I would want it to be.... Somehow to get over that pain
and you know have that comfort that I knew before, but I know that's not ever
going to come.120
Instead, participants had to adjust to the idea that their identities have been
fundamentally changed. Participant 22 explained: "It's a part of you just like every
good thing [that] happened . . . . It never goes away. It's always part of your
memory."' 12 1 Participant 28 described the inability to ignore memories of the bombing
through a particularly apt analogy:
[T]here is no closure. It's like a chain or a bracelet or a ring, it's all one. And when
So
you take a piece out of it... that piece is gone. So it'll never be complete ....
but you can come to terms with it. And you can
closure,
as
there is no such thing
122
deal with it daily.
Closure's unpopularity seemed to stem from nonvictims' assertions that complete
healing was possible, particularly within a certain timeframe. Participant 19 felt that
usage could not have been created by someone experiencing traumatic loss: "It is... a
word often used by people who, uh, probably haven't had anything big to go
through."'123 It was common to blame the media for creating unrealistic expectations;
24
Participant 17 termed closure a "media word" and a "buzz term."' The mass media,
however, is not the only party at fault; general expectations that time would heal
emotional wounds sooner rather than later were also to blame. Participant 1 connected
a dislike of the term closure to others' expectation that "people should get over it"
12 also was disturbed by others'
within a certain period of time. 125 Participant
' 26
"fine."'
be
would
soon
things
that
expectations

Interview with Participant No. 8, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (July 5, 2005).
Interview with Participant No. 10, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (July 6, 2005).
Telephone Interview with Participant No. 18 (July 24, 2005).
Interview with Participant No. 22, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (Sept. 30, 2005).
Interview with Participant No. 28, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (Apr. 30, 2006).
Interview with Participant No. 19, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (Sept. 29, 2005).
Interview with Participant No. 17, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (July 17, 2005).
Participant I remarked:
Uh,I don't like the word closure because, people have a tendency to suggest that
people should get over it, period and there's a time frame they give 'er that's a
grace period then it should all be gone it just don't happen. It all depends on the
individual and how they deal with things, and for most people, nobody's ever
totally over it they get better. That's all I know. And it's not over for any of us.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
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Sometimes participants' frustration with closure paralleled their dislike of
therapeutic language, such as assurances that certain behaviors were "normal."
Participant 21 noted:
I hate it [closure], I hate it, everybody hates it. Urn, as much as we hate the word
normal .... New normal is okay but you know, when you were going through all
the grief and the depression and you can't focus and you don't know where you
left your car, oh that's normal. Well if this is normal, I don't wanna be normal, you
know, and I hate the word normal.' 27
Whatever their source, unrealistic expectations of closure could be damaging,
according to Participant 9: "[A] lot of people think they're going to get it and they
don't then and they're upset .... ,,12 Participant 17 also asserted that closure had
become an improper justification for the death penalty:
I can see now the horrible lies that are told to... victim's family members by
prosecutors that are otherwise good people,... educated people,... about how

that they need to get the death penalty for this guy so that they can have some type
of closure and like if we bring you his dead body, you are going
to feel much
29
better about the loss of your son or daughter whoever it is .... 1
Seventeen interviewees remarked that things did get better over time. As is clear
from the comments of Participants 1, 14, and 28 concerning the absence of closure,
interviewees would often qualify a statement that there was no closure with the
observation that they had learned to "deal with it." Participant 23 distinguished closure
from coping: "I don't think there is such a thing as closure. There is such a thing as
coming to live with the experience, the traumatic experience, in your own unique way.
.. ,,130 Similarly, Participant 16 explicitly rejected a definition of closure as absolute
finality in favor of a more workable explanation as coping: "To me closure is just a,
coming to grips I guess in my own mind with what has happened and being able to
cope with what happened. I think closure and coping are kind of synonyms ..... 131
Participant 26 also believed that people often used closure to refer to an inner
peace: "I can find I think some people who say that they found closure. But I think
what they mean is they
found a peacefulness about living with what happened to them.
2
And I found that."'

13

Interview with Participant No. 1, supra note 116.
126. Participant 12 noted that:
Almost immediately people would say uh, "You're ok now, aren't you?" Why?
Why do people do that constantly, you know, from, from like the day after onward,
you're ok now, aren't you? Things will be better, you know, things are better now,
right? And they'll look at you.., it's like a demand to hear-and what counselors
and, and victims all said-was you need to be able to say, fine, things are fine.
Interview with Participant No. 12, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (July 9, 2005).
127. Interview with Participant No. 21, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (Sept. 30, 2005).
128. Interview with Participant No. 9, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (July 5, 2005).
129. Interview with Participant No. 17, supranote 124.
130. Interview with Participant No. 23, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (Oct. 2, 2005).
131. Interview with Participant No. 16, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (July 17, 2005).
132. Interview with Participant No. 26, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (Apr. 29, 2006).
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Coping behaviors included comprehending the event and placing it in context
beside other life events. Participant 2 discussed this process: "I think that closure
means you come to a point where you understand it, and it seems like it's, it's more or
less a certain point. A closure point. And for me closure was not a point but it was a
long drawn out process."' 33 Participant 3 stated that placing the bombing into context
so that it is no longer a life-governing event provided closure:
[C]losure means ... that I'm thinking, okay now what's coming up here...
[relative's] birthday... then we got the book sale, then we got my birthday, oh,
forgot, April 19th, yeah we've got the seventh anniversary... you know that
almost slipped my mind. You know .... where, it's just, it's not defining your life
anymore ....

I decided consciously that the rest of my life wasn't gonna be

defined by the bombing, if I wrote an autobiography it would be in there, but it
the rest of the book
would be perhaps a chapter, and I might refer to it throughout
134
from time to time, but it wouldn't be my defining moment.
Participant 3's observation that the bombing would be a "chapter" in an
autobiography reflects a theme of compartmentalization that was very common in
35
participant responses, which rendered the bombing a "door being closed."'
Participant 6 had an excellent description of this process:
You close off certain sections of your life and maybe in a way it is like a set of
encyclopedias that's 'x' number of volumes long and you finish this one book and
you shut that one book, but it's not that easy. You're going on to other chapters
and they're all interwoven together and sometimes you slip back to the beginning
of the first one again for a little while then come over to the fifth ....

136

Participants' ability to compartmentalize the bombing was likely to be triggered by
external goings-on, such as legal proceedings. Participant 21, for instance, noted that
McVeigh's death formed the conclusion of such a chapter: "Once he was executed37
in my life."'
again, that chapter was over I could go on with something else
Participant 27 states that closure was relief that came from knowing that McVeigh
would not "do this again."' 138 For Participant 27, the guilty verdict marked a personal
"end" to proceedings:
[J]ust a sense of relief when they found him guilty. Just a sense that he wasn't
going to be able to do it to anybody else or get off.... I remember sobbing when
they read the guilty verdict, just because it was just such a sense of-okay, it's
done. For me it was done ....39 I don't want to say closure, but I got a huge, I mean
I moved very fast-forward.1

133. Interview with Participant No. 2, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (June 24, 2005).
134. Interview with Participant No. 3, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (June 24, 2005).
135. Id.

136. Interview with Participant No. 6, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (July 3, 2005).
137. Interview with Participant No. 21, supra note 127.
138. Interview with Participant No. 27, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (Apr. 29, 2006).
139. Id.
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Participant 26 found that the opening of the Oklahoma City Bombing National
Memorial aroused similar feelings:
I've often told the story the way I felt when the Memorial opened that day, on
April 19th,2000. And when I walked down the steps I could feel the... something
being lifted from me. And Ifelt lighter and Ifelt relief. And when Ithought about
it later, I could describe it as I had been wearing an overcoat for 5 years and had
all these feelings of depression, anger, sadness, guilt, despair. All these things I'd
been carrying for 5 years. And now I had a place to hang that overcoat
and leave
4
those feelings there. I didn't need to carry them with me anymore.'
Time, however, seemed to be the biggest aid in coping, contextualizing, and
compartmentalizing the bombing. It took years for victims' families and survivors to
gain perspective on the bombing and its aftermath. As Participant 6 noted, "The
bombing certainly changed my life forever in lots of ways and it took years for me to
begin to see the good ways because the initial ways were so awful.' 14' Participant 18
stated that pain fades with time: "[Y]ou know, time, time heals a lot of that. If healing
' 42
is a good word, you know, it's just the passage of time dulls the pain that you felt."'
Other life accomplishments can also assist with life reconstruction; Participant 20
noted that "you, you get to a point, I guess where you're, where you're satisfied with
the way you feel, I guess, whether it's, uh, [you] get remarried or ...maybe had
another kid or, you get to a point, I think where hopefully you felt like you, you put it
143
at rest.'
Upon establishing a temporal and emotional distance from the bombing,
interviewees sometimes were able to point to positive changes, and specific reasons to
remember what had occurred. Participant 16 remarked:
It was bad and it was horrible and Idon't ever want to forget it. I want it, Iwant to
remember so, you know, because it was an important part of my life. It was
something that made me what I am but I'd like to move on from it too. And, one,
like Isaid one of the good things that happened for me was meeting some of these
44
people that have really become friends.
2. Closure as Therapeutic Action
What is absent from these remarks is reflection on the "lived experience" of
closure-the act of holding a suspect accountable that ostensibly motivates victims'
families to attend trials, give victim impact testimony, and witness executions. With the
exception of a few interviewees who discussed McVeigh's execution as a moment of
closure, not one defined closure explicitly as coping or healing through testimony or
execution witnessing. Instead, at other points in the interview, interviewees spoke of a
duty or responsibility to testify, and of a personal "need" to see that justice was done
connected to a desire to see McVeigh held accountable for his actions. This does not

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Interview with Participant No. 26, supranote 132.
Interview with Participant No. 6, supra note 136.
Telephone Interview with Participant No. 18, supra note 120.
Interview with Participant No. 20, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (Sept. 29, 2005).
Interview with Participant No. 16, supranote 131.
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indicate that participation in legal proceedings was not tied to closure but instead
demonstrates that legal proceedings in and of themselves did not define the boundaries
of the closure process. Legal proceedings both created new duties-a duty to self or to
a beloved victim to attend legal proceedings or witness McVeigh's execution-and
provided a venue in which those duties could be satisfied. Interviewees also felt a
desire to participate somehow in the process of seeking to hold McVeigh accountable.
For interviewees, then, closure necessitated some involvement in legal proceedings.
Testifying in open court was one way to satisfy a duty to participate in legal
proceedings. Two interviewees who were called as witnesses at McVeigh's trial felt a
tremendous duty to testify. Participant 24, a prosecution witness, felt a sense of
responsibility because he was asked by the U.S. Attorney to be a government witness
because of intimate knowledge about the Murrah Building. This duty made the act of
testifying more difficult: "[P]robably the most difficult thing I ever did because I felt a
tremendous responsibility to my friends, my coworkers, my community, to make sure
that my testimony was a part of helping to prosecute those people."' 45 Participant 20, a
critically injured survivor slated to give victim impact testimony whose testimony was
cancelled at the last minute, also spoke of a duty to help sentence McVeigh to death:
The way I looked at it was.., my story and my case and injuries... could make a
big impact and if it could help to get him the death sentence then I was... I'd do
my part, you know.... [T]hey were gonna pay my way up there for the trial and
pay the lodging and all that, but if I thought me being there would help him get the
death sentence, I'd-a paid my own way ....
Thus, Participants 24 and 20 were willing to go through a tremendous ordeal for a
higher cause in order to satisfy a complex system of responsibilities to individuals
localized and dispersed, dead and alive, known and unknown, as well as to answer the
deeds of McVeigh and Nichols.
One did not have to take the stand in order to be a trial "witness," however. Physical
presence, though a silent presence, was a profound reminder that others stood in for the
deceased victims, either out of love and duty or from a desire to gather information. As
Participant 16 stated, "I don't think I felt a duty or responsibility as much as just
wanting to know that I was there and a part of it and was able to look him in the face,
you know, and call him a creep.' 47
To attend a trial was to experience justice. Interestingly enough, fewer participants
characterized attending the trial as a duty or responsibility than as an important step in
being involved in the process. Of twenty-seven participants, fourteen did not feel a
duty or responsibility to view the trial and twelve did; one felt a duty to testify but not
to attend the trial. However, fifteen participants felt that attending the trial was an
important step in being involved in the process. Family members and survivors who
cited a need to attend the trial did so to represent victims; as Participant 22 stated:
"[Y]ou want to represent your loved one. They can't be there. You want to be there for
them.' 48 Sometimes this felt representational need stemmed from a perception that the

145.
146.
147.
148.

Interview with Participant
Interview with Participant
Interview with Participant
Interview with Participant

No. 24, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (Nov. 2, 2005).
No. 20, supra note 143.
No. 16, supra note 131.
No. 22, supra note 121.

1500

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 85:1477

victim would have wanted that person to attend, a need to keep others from forgetting
the victim, or a need to be a spokesperson for the victim. As Participant 28 remarked:
If it had been the
I felt I did for.., for my [child]. I felt... she can't be there ....
other way round, if it had been me, she'd be there ....
She would have been very
vocal ....And that's the least Icould do as her parent... to be there and be her
149
voice ....
Thus, attending legal proceedings to represent a deceased victim served the function of
somehow keeping alive that person's presence, and invoking it to achieve
accountability.
Family members and survivors who attended the trial in Denver constantly
scrutinized the defendants' behaviors; as Participant 25 noted, these behaviors "were
some of the things that we was [sic] trying to watch and see how both of them would
react under circumstances." '1 50 Participant 17 described the intensity ofthis behavioral
scrutiny: "[D]uring lunch breaks and all that they are talking that all of this angry thing
and how this person you know or what McVeigh did at the table, where you're sitting
there.., that he had expression of some kind or how he sat on the chair ....
,,151
The
nature of the Denver courtroom was a more intimate space with increased opportunities
to view body language.
Another reason frequently cited by family members and survivors was the need for
information; information was essential for comprehension, since one must know what
occurred to understand it. Five participants felt a responsibility to attend for
information-gathering purposes. Participant 10 attended to gain "insight" into why the
bombing occurred "to see if I could... figure out why he could do something like that
...I never got any... insight to it but I felt better." 152 This craving for information
could be a consuming need: "I needed to find out everything that went on, how it went
on, how they was [sic] able to prosecute or catch him and all these things. The more I
knew about what was going on and in that case the better off I was ....
,53Participant
22 described this need as a desperate hunger: "[A] huge part of going was information.
I just was starved for information."' 54 For Participant 23, live attendance was key for
increased accuracy, "so that when I spoke about it, when I thought about it, it was
based on facts and rule of law and ...not just driven by rumor and emotion.' ' 55 Two
participants remarked that information helped them to put the "puzzle pieces" back
together; as Participant 22 remarked, "[T]hat court room is the very best source ....
You can't get it from the papers. There's not enough there.
You gotta be in that
156
courtroom to get those pieces of your puzzle back together."'
Willingness to attend the trial was connected to the expectation that trials would
play an essential role in recovery. Some participants did not attend the trial or ceased to

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Id.
Interview
Interview
Interview
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with
with
with

Participant
Participant
Participant
Participant

No. 28,
No. 25,
No. 17,
No. 10,

supranote 122.
Oklahoma City, Okla. (Apr. 29, 2006).
supranote 124.
supranote 119.

with Participant No. 22, supra note 121.
with Participant No. 23, supra note 130.
with Participant No. 22, supra note 121.
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attend when it became apparent that the attendance experience would not assist with
coping or healing, or worse, would hinder such recovery efforts.
Finally, five participants' statements evidenced a desire to bear witness to "justice"
live. Participant I attended from a "desire to see that, that justice was served and
witness it so that if it didn't come out the way I knew it should've I could understand
why it didn't" and also intended to signify to the jury that many were very concerned
about the trial outcome.157 Justice was the only proper response to the victims'
murders; Participant 8 noted: "[W]e didn't have our loved ones. I mean at least we
could see that we got justice."' 5 8 Some survivors felt that the trial was the rare forum in
which they received justice; Participant 15 remarked: "It was like, there is justice and
there was a lot of times
when we didn't feel like we had any, there was not any justice
' 59
for the survivors."'

Like participants' desire to attend the trial, their desire to witness the execution was
linked to the role that they expected it to play in healing or life reconstruction, invoking
the stereotypical link between execution and closure. Significantly, U.S. Attorney
General John Ashcroft consented to televise the execution via closed-circuit television
to accommodate more witnesses for the very purpose of effecting closure.1 60 Some
participants did not hesitate to decouple the witnessing experience from closure
because it would not restore murdered loved ones to life or because their focus was no
longer on vengeance against McVeigh. Others chose to witness because they perceived
a need to be present for the last legal proceeding for purposes of finality or because
they needed to bear witness to justice.
Eighteen participants did not feel a duty or responsibility to view the execution, and
only nine said that they did. Participants' most common reason for not feeling a duty or
responsibility to witness was that it was unnecessary since it would not provide closure
or assist in healing, or that participants had "moved on." In short, most people did not
feel that witnessing the execution would assist them; some, like Participant 14, felt that
witnessing was useless because it could not alter the past, while others, such as
Participant 24, supported a death sentence for McVeigh but had "moved on." Of the
nine participants who felt a duty or responsibility to witness, the two most frequent
justifications were a personal need to be present (to be involved or to see justice done)

157.
158.
159.
160.

Interview with Participant No. 1, supra note 116.
Interview with Participant No. 8, supra note 118.
Interview with Participant No. 15, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (July 16, 2005).
Ashcroft stated:
I also met with about 100 survivors and victim family members on Tuesday to hear
their stories and to try to understand their loss. The magnitude of this case is
certainly stunning. My time with these brave survivors changed me. What was
taken from them can never be replaced nor fully restored. Their lives were
shattered, and I hope that we can help them meet their need to close this chapter in
their lives.
Press Release, John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General, Dep't of Justice, Attorney General
Ashcroft's Statement Regarding the Execution of Timothy McVeigh (Apr. 12,2001), available
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2001/Apri/169ag.htm [hereinafter Ashcroft's Statement].
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in response to what McVeigh had done (three participants) and a need to see it through
to completion, often related to fighting to have the execution televised (three
participants). Citing a need to see justice done, Participant 15 remarked: "I guess I
wanted to see him suffer but he didn't suffer .... The execution was something I
needed to do for myself because I deserved; I believed he needed to be punished
because he knew those babies were in that daycare. '' 61
Participant 22 witnessed for reasons of completion-to see the process through, to
know exactly what happened, and because she had fought to have the execution
broadcast via closed-circuit TV:
I was not joyful about it even though I'd fought so hard for that to happen .... It
was a difficult thing for me to do because it's not, watching someone die is not
something I just thought I really wanted to do but I felt I'd fought so hard for that I
had been through the trials.... I had watched
that man and I needed to complete
162
the process. I needed to see it through.
Similarly, Participant 29, a family member and live witness, felt a profound need to
physically be present at McVeigh's execution:
I think that was the most important thing to me.... I could have viewed it at the
FAA center if I had to .... But it was.., complete relief when I found out I was
one of the ten selected .... [T]here aren't enough words to describe how important
it was for me to do that. Oh wow. It's just... I still can't believe it.... Oh163God, I
don't even know if I can put that into words .... Physically being there.
Participants 7 and 29 also felt much compelled to complete the process. The desire to
be present to obtain completion suggests that the conclusion of legal proceedings
against an offender is important in comprehending the event; one has a complete
narrative when the offender has been convicted and held accountable through serving
his sentence, particularly when the act of serving the sentence is accomplished virtually
instantaneously through death.
Ideally, for reconstructive processes to be successful, traumatic crimes merit
punishments of an appropriate severity. Certainly participants had different opinions of
this sentence according to their death penalty beliefs, 164 but for the majority who
supported McVeigh's death sentence, his execution was the "answer" to the bombing,
and witnessing the execution was seen as a way to answer McVeigh, an affirmative act
that was not only bearing witness to justice but using one's presence as protest. The
idea of seeing justice done encompasses needs for two forms of resolution:
accountability, and the spectacle of that accountability. Participant 12, though unable
to attend due to injuries incurred in the bombing, characterized the execution as a
"response": "[T]he execution was a response to what he did to us and so I would like to
have witnessed it ....

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Interview with Participant No. 15, supra note 159.
Interview with Participant No. 22, supra note 121.
Telephone Interview with Participant No. 29 (May 22, 2006).
See Madeira, Blood Relations, supra note 107, at 121-24.
Interview with Participant No. 12, supra note 126.
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Thus, in summary, like his federal trial, McVeigh's execution provided
opportunities for further closure work, with participants' willingness to witness the
execution stemming from their expectations of what the experience of witnessing
would accomplish.
I1. A NEW, COMMUNICATwE, THEORY OF CLOSURE
As the previous discussion summarizing prior work on closure illustrates, scholars
have not yet pushed the concept of closure far enough. Research on closure in the
context of the Oklahoma City bombing demonstrates that it is far more complicated
than overcoming grief and seeking vengeance, and reveals a great deal about how
expectations about what closure is and how it functions should be modified.
First, it is essential to regard closure as a cluster concept that includes coping
behaviors, not as a state of consummate finality; this comports with victims' families'
perspectives and avoids undue simplification. Second, closure is a phenomenon that
exists in both the internal self and the external world; it is not purely emotional, nor is
it based only on external events. Many researchers, however, situate closure in one
realm or the other---either the inward-directed context of grief recovery, or the
outward-directed milieu of seeking vengeance. While closure is primarily an "internal"
experience, taking place in the interior realm of the psyche, it is dependent upon events
in the outside world. One might conceive of closure as a sort of feedback loop
connecting the external environment with the internal thought processes that are
triggered the moment a family member is notified of a relative's murder. Developments
in the external world-from preliminary events such as the arrest of a suspect or the
search for and discovery of a body to later goings-on such as a verdict or executionprompt the formation of both immediate and long-term internal reactions that range
from affective responses to strategic plans. In essence, an external event affects a
victim's relative, who then reacts, in turn affecting the external environment. Crucially,
this feedback loop never closes; it is triggered at least several times a year on
"anniversary" dates such as the victim's birthday, holidays, or the events of legal
proceedings. Optimally, victims' families grow more adept at managing their status and
its implications over time. Closure, then, is a process at which victims' families must
continually work.
Third, closure is not restricted to grief maintenance or vengeance-seeking
behaviors. Instead, it is a balancing act that demands that victims' families
simultaneously manage a multitude of concerns such as remembering the victim,
representing the victim, channeling emotion into effective outlets, following legal
proceedings, insisting on recognition, and moderating outward displays of anger and
other emotions. Should any of these spinning plates fall to the ground, the whole act
may collapse.
Fourth, to say that closure may be derived from participation in trials acknowledges
and legitimates the secondary effects that legal proceedings have for persons other than
defendants. State statutes may affirmatively protect the integrity and visibility of
communicative messages the victim airs at trial, including victim impact statements
and buttons bearing the victim's photo. In Oklahoma, for example, a written victim
impact statement introduced at sentencing "shall not be amended by any person other

1504

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 85:1477

than the author, nor shall such statement be excluded in whole or in part from the court
record.' 66 In addition, the state also permits immediate family members of murder
victims to wear photo buttons "containing a picture of the victim as a symbol of grief in
a trial" which "shall not exceed four (4) inches in diameter"; this statute goes beyond
protecting the right to wear photo
buttons and actually dictates what communicative
167
purpose such buttons serve.
Similarly, numerous scholars have recognized that trials have dramaturgic elements
and convey symbolic social messages ofcondemnation,168 in keeping with observations
on the symbolic functions of punishment 169 for society and for the victim. 170 Criminal
trials "serv[e] as prime instances of 'performing the laws'-allowing matters of
common public concern to be enunciated and deliberated before the populace."' 17
Academic opposition to the pursuit of closure in capital proceedings also assumes that
trials are more than just official inquiries into guilt or innocence, 17 2 and some
researchers have commented upon the effects of the defendant's demeanor on
proceedings. 73 Executions, too, are communicative events, 74 with the potential for
interactive engagement between the condemned and victim witnesses; even the
execution routine, including the identity of the executioner, has potential
communicative implications. According to Bilz, this is why the State does not allow
victims' families to activate the execution machinery, forsaking an executioner who
would take personal pleasure in killing in favor of an impersonal one who can embody
social condemnation. 75 When vengeful parties act as executioners, the results are
particularly unsettling; one need only recall the behavior
of the members of Sadri Al
76
Mustafa's militia who executed Saddam Hussein.1

166. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 984.1 (West Supp. 2009).
167. OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 984.3 (West Supp. 2009).
168. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, CourtroomDemeanor:The Theaterof the Courtroom,92
MINN.L. REv. 573 (2008).
169. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
(1995); DAVID GARLAND, PUNIsHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 23447 (1990); PETER SPIERENBURG, THE SPECTACLE OF SUFFERING: EXECUMiON AND THE EVOLUTION
OF REPRESSION (1984).
170. As Bilz observes, "when a criminal offender is punished, community members increase
their estimation of the social standing of the victim; they admire, respect, and value her more. In

contrast, when the offender escapes conventional punishment, community members report
admiring, respecting, and valuing the victim less." Kenworthey Bilz, The Puzzle of Delegated

Revenge, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1059, 1088 (2007) (emphasis in original).
171. Logan, ConfrontingEvil, supra note 21, at 756.
172. Bandes, Sociology, supranote 8, at 11 ("Lower courts explicitly invoke the concept of
closure.").
173. See, e.g., Jody Lyne6 Madeira, When It's So Hard To Relate: Can Legal Systems
Mitigatethe Traumaof Victim-Offender Relationships?,46 HOUS. L. REv. 401,409-11 (2008)
(discussing effect of defendant's demeanor on victims' family members) [hereinafter Madeira,
Victim-Offender Relationships]; see also Levenson, supra note 168 (discussing impact of

demeanor upon jurors).
174. Madeira, Blood Relations, supra note 107, at 102-04; see also Gross & Matheson,
supra note 28, at 503 (describing the communicative interactions in a "hallmark" execution).
175. Bilz, supra note 170, at 1093-94.
176. Id.
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Fifth, and most importantly, the process of closure is communicative in nature. It is
in actuality not concerned with effecting a "closing" but instead with bringing about an
"opening"-a broadening of awareness, an expanded engagement with the external
environment, a readiness to reencounter life. A communicative theory of closure
acknowledges the interplay of the interpersonal and the intrapersonal, the interior of
the self and the exterior of the other, the outside world. The search for closure is
dependent upon communicative abilities and potencies. Victims' families seek to
communicatively engage with others, to both speak and be spoken to. We recognize
this communicative tendency when we speak of giving victims a "voice" through
legal scholars, have
victim impact testimony. Ironically, communication scholars, like
77
long been aware of the prejudicial effects of certain messages. 1
Scholars have implicitly acknowledged the communicative dimensions of closure.
The means by which victims supposedly pursue closure are performative:
"Satisfaction" re-enters legal discourse as the state finds itself setting up
performances for and through victims. Achieving the efficacious experience of
emotional satisfaction is presumed to be the goal of these performances: when
victims view an execution, when victims make statements before and after
sentencing, statements after a conviction approving the punishment, and when
victims sometimes address convicted criminals after sentencing. These maneuvers
are widely seen as valuable because they appear to address victims' desire for
178
closure ....
Gross and Matheson's concept of a "hallmark execution" also emphasizes a
performative ideal of communicative interchange, and consists of four elements: "(1)
The condemned killer looks directly at the victim's family, accepts responsibility for
his crimes and apologizes to them honestly and sincerely; (2) the family accepts the
apology and forgives him; (3) the killer achieves peace and (presumably) is reconciled
to God; and (4) the killer is put to death."' 179 Finally, Bandes notes that therapy and a
courtroom involve very different communicative norms, with the consequence that
judges may be ill-suited to help family members manage grief. Whereas grieving in a
private therapeutic setting would produce sympathy, such behaviors elicit8 0silence,
unease, or other inappropriate reactions from judges in a public courtroom.1
In essence, a communicative theory of closure is necessary because it acknowledges
the unique communicative benefits inherent in legal proceedings, refocuses the closure
inquiry on the process of attainment instead of its semantics, and helps explain why
scholars should regard closure as a term that is complete in and of itself (not one that
should be divided into subcategories).

177. Communication scholars, like legal academics, have long been worried about the
pernicious effects of certain forms of communication, like propaganda. The notion that a
number of forms of evidence are unduly prejudicial has its twin in fears dating back to the 1920s
that an educated public is incapable of rising to the challenge of governance due to perils such
as isolated individuals or mass gullibility. JOHN DURHAM PETERS, SPEAKING INTO THE AIR: A
HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF COMMUNICATION 12 (1999). Thus was born the idea that "face-to-face
dialogue or at least confrontation offered a way out from the crusts of modernity ..."Id.at 19.
178. Kanwar, supranote 16, at 239.
179. Gross & Matheson, supra note 28, at 503.
180. Bandes, Sociology, supra note 8, at 17-18.
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Such a theory recognizes that legal proceedings such as trials and executions are
themselves communicative forums.' 8 1 Victims' families realize that these legal
proceedings are often the only places where they may find certain building blocks of
closure, such as information, the opportunity to scrutinize defendants' behaviors, and
accountability. It is impossible, then, to cut closure entirely out of capital legal
proceedings; if the current judicial reliance on closure is any indication, courts would
already be very reluctant to do so. Thus, the task becomes two-fold: defining closure,
and attempting to provide channels for it that do not pinch a defendant's constitutional
rights.
Regarding closure as communicative also reframes the closure inquiry, focusing on
how closure can be attained instead of on its subjectivities. Leaving aside the
unworkable notion of closure as utter finality, individuals have described closure as
coping with the bombing, dealing or learning to live with it, laying it to rest, moving on
or moving forward, reaching a point of satisfaction, forgiving the offenders, not letting
the event dominate one's life, incorporating the bombing into one's personal identity,
and putting things into perspective. This analysis of what closure can mean establishes
that it is a real and attainable concept, and prompts the need to examine how to
effectuate closure, which in turn reveals its communicative dimensions. There are only
a finite number of ways in which the legal system can assist victims' families in their
closure pursuit-allowing them to attend the trial, to view the defendant's behavior, to
deliver victim impact testimony, to deliver post-sentence allocution, to meet with the
offender in mediation, and to witness an execution. Significantly, all of them are
founded upon communicative behaviors.
Finally, viewing closure through communication theory suggests that it is unhelpful
to speak of different "types" of closure, such as "legal closure," "emotional closure," or
"psychological closure." 182 Closure, which denotes family members' attempts to adjust
to murder's aftermath, reflects not many types of coping, but rather coping on many
different levels. Victims' families employ similar coping strategies in many different
forums; the idea that "legal closure" is really different from "emotional closure"
introduces artificial distinctions. Referring to different types of closure may be a wellintentioned attempt to fully grasp its dimensions, but it is an analytic misstep that
inadvertently oversimplifies closure, and is therefore synonymous with the worst
practice in that term's usage-referencing complete finality.
Applying communication theory to closure also corrects two common scholarly
misconceptions as to the concept's history and its ties to therapeutic jurisprudence.
Closure has not recently been injected into criminal proceedings in the form of victim
participation and impact testimony. Rather, such expectations have been there all
along; trials have always been one of the few places in which victims could accomplish
reconstructive goals such as gaining information and insight into the defendant's
demeanor and holding the defendant accountable. This observation calls into question
legal scholars' tendency to regard victim participation as a recent and unwelcome

181. See Madeira, Blood Relations, supra note 107, at 102-04; Madeira, Victim-Offender
Relationships, supranote 173, at 417-18.
182. Armour & Umbreit, supra note 18, at 418 ("There are also types of closure. Judicial
closure may refer to the end of survivors' involvement with the criminal justice system.

Emotional closure may mean letting go of long-standing anger toward the murderer.
Psychological closure may signify the completion of a final act to honor the victim.").
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development legitimized by the Supreme Court in Payne. Furthermore, if scholars are
correct and victim impact testimony does impinge upon defendants' rights, it cannot be
an instance of therapeutic jurisprudence, as its principles do not support the
subordination of due process or other fundamental legal tenets.' 8 3 Indeed, "therapeutic
jurisprudence has always suggested that therapeutic goals should be achieved only
within the limits of considerations of justice."'184 Thus, if pursuing closure as a goal
undermines defendants' constitutional rights, such an activity would not comport with
therapeutic jurisprudence.
A communicative theory of closure is comprised of two types of behaviors:
reflexivity and intervention. Closure as reflexivity denotes reflective, or thoughtful,
behavior; closure as intervention consists of physical action. The division of closure
into these interdependent internal and external dualities finds support in historical and
contemporary research. In his 1914 essay Remembering, Repeating, and WorkingThrough, 85 Freud developed the interdependent concepts of "acting-out" and
"working-through" trauma; whereas acting-out consists primarily of "continuous
repetitions of the original trauma or subjection that constitute and maintain
subjectivity,,,186 working-through is the process of ending these traumatic repetitions by
negotiating an appropriate interpretation of an event with psychotherapeutic
assistance.18 7 Acting-out pushes aside trauma; working-through engages and "dissolves
give rise to it.'1 88
... tension gradually by changing the internal conditions which
Working-through parallels reflexive and interventive closure processes, in which
victims' families break cycles of negative affect by pursuing new goals, such as
holding the offender accountable, which require them to reestablish interpersonal
relations in which they might discuss the murder.
More recently, Armour has referred to internal and external dimensions in coping
with murder, observing that "because the deeds that mark the journey for homicide
survivors are often done in reaction to being in the public eye, meaning making is both
an intrapersonal and interpersonal endeavor."' 89 According to Armour, the
"intrapersonal level consisted of the individual's appraisal of self and other including
the significance to the homicide survivor of his or her behavior," whereas the
interpersonal level "consisted of actions done in response to external events and

183. See Winick, supra note 46, at 191. As Winick states, "Although therapeutic
jurisprudence suggests that law should be used to promote mental health and psychological
functioning, it does not suggest that psychological and physical health is a transcending norm. It
suggests that law reform should be informed by this value, but only when otherwise normatively
unobjectionable." Id.
at203.
184. Id.
185. Sigmund Freud, Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through (Further
Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis II) (1914), reprinted in 12 THE
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 145 (James

Strachey trans. & ed., 1958).
186. KELLY OLIVER, WITNESSING: BEYOND RECOGNIrON 76 (2001).

187. Seeid. at81.
188. Id. at 77 (quoting Edward Bibring, The Conception of the Repetition Compulsion, 12
PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 486, 502 (1943)).
189. Marilyn Armour, MeaningMaking in the Aftermath ofHomicide, 27 DEATH STUD. 519,
520 (2003).
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meaning made in interaction with others including190family, friends, representatives of
social institutions, and others in the community.'
A. Closure as Reflexivity
Focusing on closure as reflexive, or thoughtful, behavior requires broadening one's
analytical focus from grieving to narrativity. Academics frequently associate closure
with grieving, asserting that "courts cannot bring about the ultimate moment of
cessation in an infinitely more complicated process of grieving"' 91 or that grief is
exorcised through participation in capital proceedings. 192 There is no doubt that
victims' families grieve for murdered loved ones. However, grieving does not
encapsulate the full range of emotional responses which family members experience in
the aftermath of murder. Grieving refers to sadness or mourning in response to loss; in
addition, however, family members suffer many other emotional and psychological
aftershocks, including trauma, simplified moral schemas, a desperate need for
information, anger, alienation, and helplessness. 193 Because these responses are
intertwined with grieving behavior, their amelioration, for example, a restoration of
control, might assist in the mourning process. However, just because these responses
overlap with grieving does not mean that they are synonymous with such behaviors.
Moreover, relying upon grieving terminology actually has pernicious effects.
Regarding victims' families through the lens of grieving may set them apart as
unhealed and therefore emotionally diseased or even mentally disordered, through no
fault of their own. This in turn prompts coddling reactions, reinforcing family
members' powerlessness and further alienating them. As Rock notes, "[V]iolent,
intentional death is linked inextricably with images of powerlessness-the
powerlessness of the victim to resist, and the powerlessness of the bereaved to
intervene at the time of the killing and to control events thereafter."' 94 Yet, the task of
healing requires precisely the opposite-empowerment through participative
opportunities in which family members can fulfill perceived responsibilities to
deceased victims, exercise agency, and undertake strategies to ensure accountability.
Effecting change for victims' families necessitates avoiding measures that inadvertently
keep victims powerless. Victims hardly need assistance that exacerbates their
weaknesses instead of encouraging them to develop new strengths. It is for these
reasons that family members and survivors of the Oklahoma City bombing "sought
information, a restoration of control, and an end to the marginality which magnified
their feelings of powerlessness and kept them apart from important sources of
understanding."' 195 In addition, summarizing the emotional state of victims' family
members under the category of "grieving" inappropriately widens the perceived gap
between criminal adjudication and victims' family members. It is much harder to
fathom a court playing a role in grief recovery-a task for grief counselors-than it is

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.at 535.
Kanwar, supranote 16, at 242.
See Bibas, supra note 11, at 1410.
See Madeira, Blood Relations, supra note 107, at 86-87.
ROcK, supra note 27, at 53.
Id.at 99.
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to envision it restoring some elements of control to victims by affording them some
participative opportunities in the criminal justice process.
Broadening the focus on victim behavior from grieving to coping, reflexive closure
entails narrativity-leaming how to structure and ultimately tell the story of the
murder. The debate over the proper place of victims in criminal proceedings is actually
a debate over which narratives belong where, implicating both "narrative relevance (is
the trauma of the surviving family members of a murder victim relevant to the guilt of
the sequels to murder, in the sufferings of the
the defendant?) and narrative closure (are
196
story?).'
murder
the
of
part
survivors,
Coping entails learning how to narrate the murder and its aftermath. Until it is
closed through narrative, the world is an open sea awash with myriad interpretations of
events. Forming a narrative of an event fixes it in a certain form, with definite
interpretive consequences. 197 Narrative, then, is a form of sense making that imposes
"fictive concords with origins and ends, such as give meaning to lives." 198 Moreover, a
narrative imposes structural constraints upon a series of events, confirming that a life is
progressing and changing, and explaining these changes. 199 This narrative continuity is
as important for our interpersonal relations as it is for our intrapersonal relations:
If we are to play a believable role before an audience of relative strangers we must
produce or at least imply a history of ourselves: an informal account which
indicates something of our origins and which justifies or perhaps excuses our
present status and actions in relation to that audience.2°
A narrative resolution is merely a sensible arrangement of events around such turning
points, what Henry James refers to as the "distribution at the last of prizes, pensions,
husbands, wives, babies, millions, appended paragraphs, and cheerful remarks." 2 °' Law
is a site in which participants seek and deliver narrative closure; for instance, in a trial,
attorneys can prompt lead jurors to become either passive or active decision makers
through linguistic cues, and jurors who become active decision makers can provide the
closure that the attorney's account lacks.20 2

196. Peter Brooks, Narrativity of the Law, 14 LAw & LITERATURE 1, 5 (2002).
197. As defined by Labov and Fanshel, narrative analysis relies on order and structure, and is
"one means of representing past experience by a sequence of ordered sentences that present the
temporal sequence of those events by that order." WILLIAM LABov & DAVID FANSHEL,
THERAPEUTIC DISCOURSE: PSYCHOTHERAPY AS CONVERSATION 105 (1977).
198. FRANK KERMODE, THE SENSE OF AN ENDING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF FICTION 7

(1967).
199. Jody Lyned Madeira, A ConstructedPeace:NarrativesofSuture in the News Media, 19
CAN. J.L. & Soc'Y 93, 94 (2004).
200. PAUL CONNERTON, How SOCIETIES REMEMBER 17 (1989).
201. Id.at 16-17.
202. See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing
Arguments to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 55, 75-110 (1992) (examining prosecution and

defense arguments in a murder trial as dialogic structures). Possible techniques include using
verbs and active metaphors in describing the events leading to the accident and the evidence,
using present tense to discuss crucial points in the story, and strategically deploying rhetorical
questions. NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: How JuRoRs THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS

121 (2001).
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The struggle to narrate a traumatic event such as a murder is a struggle to pull
together the self that has survived.2 3 Thus, narrative is as much a tool of selfcomprehension as it is of interpersonal understanding. 2° 4 Finally, narrative is a form of
communication that "allow[s] us to interact meaningfully with others and to make those
interactions comprehensible and memorable. ' 20 5 Communication itself always involves
strategic deployment of narratives; 20 6 we must "select[] the stories that we know and
tell[] them to others at the right time. 20 7 Narrative also accomplishes paramount
to get attention, to win
communicative functions, serving "to achieve catharsis,
2' 08
approval, to seek advice, or to describe [our]selves."
Crises, in particular -"the discords of our experience',2°9- demand narration. 210 A
murder is indisputably a crisis. Journalistic narration of crises perhaps explains why the
media defines closure as utter finality; such news coverage is characterized by a
"narrative lingering" that emphasizes not only the "tragic distance between is and
ought but also the possibility of heroic overcoming." 211 This heroic overcoming
212
celebrates the indomitability of the individual, a key value in news coverage.
Healing that stops short of completion is simply not as compelling. In a news story
covering a murder, individuals such as victims' families "play large- or small-scale
restorative functions in an attempt to again make right what was made wrong, or more
appropriately, to make right what was not addressed by organizations and institutions
charged with bringing wrongdoers to justice. 2 13
Thus,"the condition of narrative is unsurpassable. 214 Narratives have performative
qualities, 215 and in their performativity, are used to "advance certain theses or to make
knowledge claims ....,,216 Formulating a narrative also allows a victim's family
members to entomb the dead in representative form, simultaneously laying them to rest
and fixing them in place; according to Lyotard and Thebaud, "'the dead are not dead so

203. Armour, supra note 189, at 521 ("[P]eople who have experienced traumatic loss...
assimilate the loss by constructing a coherent self-narrative that preserves a sense of continuity
about who they have been and are now.").
204. ROGER C. SCHANK, TELL ME A STORY: A NEW LOOK AT REAL AND ARTIFICIAL MEMORY
44 (1990) ("We tell stories to describe ourselves not only so others can understand who we are
but also so we can understand ourselves.").
205. Madeira, supra note 199, at 95.
206. See generally id.
207. SCHANK, supra note 204, at 12.

208. Id. at 41.
209. KERMODE, supra note 198, at 80.
210. Madeira, supra note 199, at 102.
211.

RONALD N. JACOBS, RACE, MEDIA, AND THE CRISIS OF CIviL SOCIETY: FROM WATTS TO

RODNEY KING

212.

9 (2000).
J.GANS,

HERBERT

DECIDING WHAT'S NEWS:

NIGHTLYNEWS, NEWSWEEK, AND

A

STUDY OF

CBS EVENING NEWS, NBC

TIME 50 (1979).

213. Madeira, supra note 199, at 103.
214. BILL READINGS, INTRODUCING LYOTARD: ART AND POLmCs 65 (1991).
215. See JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD & JEAN-LOuP TtuBAUD, JUST GAMING 6 (Wlad Godzich
trans., 1979).
216. READINGS, supranote 214, at 81.
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long as the living have not recorded their death in narratives'.... One is dead when
one is narrated and no longer anything but narrated." 217
Narrative as a sense-making activity imposes structure, thus altering the
manageability of a murder's aftermath. Narrative development is often the first step
that victims' family members must take in order to prepare themselves to engage in
interventive behaviors. It also imposes a therapeutic distance between the narrator and
the story. For a victim's relative who is struggling to regain control, it offers a means of
grabbing the reins of the horses hitched to the runaway litigation wagon. Therefore, by
learning how to narrate the8murder, victims exercise narrative agency and thus regain a
21
needed sense of control.
B. Closure as Intervention
Closure as intervention incorporates victims' reflexive accomplishments; victims
who intervene not only share their narratives of the murder, but do so strategically.
Creating a narrative of a murder's aftermath is one way to establish some degree of
control, and may indeed aid victims' families in coming to terms with their new status
and its implications. However, such narratives do not walk or talk on their own and can
only effect change in the extemal world if they are delivered to others. This and other
intervention behaviors, such as victim impact testimony, demand the physical presence
of victims' family members. Through intervention, victims' families in effect choose
their preferred means of closure and endeavor to bring it about by identifying which
legal outcome they prefer, strategizing how to effectuate it, and following through with
that plan.219
In the interventive process, victims stand to gamer others' recognition and respect
and gain an even greater degree of control in the process. According to Hoffman,
allowing victims' families to participate in sentencing proceedings may be seen as
restitution, in which the defendant sacrifices sentence predictability for the mortal
losses he has inflicted upon others. 220 Therefore, participation may be therapeutic, in
that it assists family members to regain agency 221 and thus enables empowerment and
enhances trust in legal proceedings. 222 Arrigo and Williams also describe victim
participation as an activity that is "largely regarded as a means to provide those harmed
(including family members) with much-deserved recognition and, consequently, some
amount of power and control in the system in which they find themselves as unwilling
participants and in a process from which they have been alienated as noncontributing
outsiders. 223 Given the high stakes of participation, it is not surprising that "[m]ore

BEVERLEY SOUTHGATE, WHAT Is HISTORY FOR? 57 (2005).
218. See Hoffman, supra note 91, at 538.
219. Cf.Armour, supra note 189. Armour states that "the performative dimension of

217.

meaning making is a form of coping in response to the appraised meaning of post-homicide

events." Id.at 525. Armour characterizes this performative dimension as "fighting for what's
right," including "fighting for what's mine" and "fighting to correct what's wrong." Id.at 526.
220. Hoffman, supra note 91, at 538.
221. Id.
222. See id.
223. Arrigo & Williams, supra note 44, at 603--04.
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than 75% of victims surveyed considered it very important to be heard or involved in
charge dismissals, plea negotiations, sentencings, and parole proceedings." 224 All this
is to say that victims derive psychic or affective benefits from participation in legal
proceedings. Successful participation--defined by one's ability to carry out the
participative task, not by sentencing outcome-restores agency and control and allows
for the display of self-control, allowing the victim to step away from a state of
perceived powerlessness, silence, and incapacity. Thus, external behaviors have a very
real impact on life reconstruction.
The issue of victim participation begs the question of whether victims expect that
attending a trial and/or execution will fulfill all of their mental health needs, as many
scholars assert. Victims' families do not indiscriminately expect every person or
institution to assist them in attaining closure. This is not to say that cultural mediums
do not hype the forms and extent of closure that can be derived from legal proceedings,
perhaps prompting some family members to place all of their closure eggs in the
execution basket. However, they realize that a trial or execution is not a counseling
session, and regard the trial as an opportunity to effectuate important goals that can be
accomplished nowhere else, such as information gathering and extracting
accountability. 225 Thus, family members use the trial not so much to overcome grief but
to gain understanding and some measure of control that is lost upon
victimization and
226
again when family members are silenced in legal proceedings.
Three intervention behaviors are worthy of attention: maintaining a participative
presence at legal proceedings, a desire to confront the defendant, and giving victim
impact testimony (discussed in the following Part). Together, these behaviors cover the
range of communicative closure needs: performative events that family members want
to witness, what family members want to communicate to the defendant, and what
family members want the defendant to communicate to them.
Previous scholars have overwhelmingly asserted that vengeance becomes a goal for
victims' families. The term is often used synonymously with family members' anger at
the offender; Kanwar, for instance, defines vengeance broadly as the desire to punish
someone based on satisfaction derived from seeing that person punished. 27 Thus,
seeking vengeance is certainly an intervention behavior. Minow provides a more
nuanced definition:
Vengeance is the impulse to retaliate when wrongs are done. Through vengeance,
we express our basic self-respect.... Vengeance is also the wellspring of a notion
of equivalence that animates justice ..... Yet vengeance could unleash more
response than the punishment guided by the rule of law ....

224. Bibas, supra note 11, at 929.
225. See generally Madeira, Victim-Offender Relationships,supranote 173.

226. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, IntegratingRemorse andApology into
CriminalProcedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 136 (2004).
227. Kanwar, supra note 16, at 240; see also Arrigo & Williams, supra note 44, at 609

(stating that victim impact testimony is "fueled... by expressions of pain, anger, resentment,
and vengeance"); Bandes, Empathy,supra note 91, at 396 (stating that victim impact statements
evoke "undifferentiated vengeance"); Bandes, Victims, supra note 16, at 1606 (referring to an
individual's needs for "vengeance, forgiveness, closure").
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The danger is that precisely the same vengeful motive often leads people to
exact more than necessary ....The core motive may be admirable but it carries
Vengeance thus can set in motion a downward spiral
with it potential insatiability.
22
of violence ....8
Few victims, however, pursue so radical a goal; instead, most focus on
accountability. Vengeance seems more to describe the white-hot hatred for the offender
that consumes a relative immediately after the murder then it does the more tempered
demand for accountability with which he approaches the trial. It connotes extremity or
even savagery, hence the phrase, "with a vengeance." Accountability, in contrast, is the
obligation or willingness to accept responsibility for one's actions; those who attempt
to evade responsibility may be "held accountable," or have accountability forced upon
them and punishment extracted. Family members opt for justice or accountability over
vengeance by allowing the criminal justice system to try an offender, and not killing
the offender themselves. 229 They wish to live in a world that is again governed by
civilized norms, and some may even take pride in the example of extending rights to an
230
Thus, as Armour notes, family
offender that the murder victim did not have.
members "forcefully assert themselves by holding others accountable and claiming
what is rightfully theirs. Their interventions become symbolic statements about the
their right to be seen. Their actions help re-establish
importance of their experience and
231
a moral and principled world.",
Victims' family members often intervene by attending or directly participating in
legal proceedings. Those who attend maintain a participative presence; attendance
itself has distinct participative qualities, such as when a mother of a murder victim is
determined to become "a visible presence" at legal proceedings held for the eight boys
who murdered her son, a father of a murder victim breaks into applause after the guilty
23 2
or an
verdict (prompting the murderer to turn around and give him "the finger"),
execution witness brings a photo into the viewing chamber and holds it up to the glass.
These behaviors are forms of bearing witness, a term which implies not a voyeuristic
gaze but an interactive experience, for "witnessing is always, at a fundamental level, a
relationship of mediation." 233 Thus, these activities exemplify forms of vigilance,
which is most often indicative of dedication to the project of self-healing.
Maintaining a visible presence also requires witnesses to attend "in person," which
is crucial for gaining accurate and timely information and impressions of legal

228. MiNow, supra note 6, at 10.
229. See Bilz, supra note 170, at 1093-94.
230. See, e.g., Madeira, supra note 199, at 114-17.
231. Armour, supra note 189, at 529.
232. Id. (stating that "[h]is applause redefines the occasion as joyous rather than somber,
reestablishes that he, rather than the state, is the aggrieved party, and congratulates the judge,
jury, and prosecution on a job well done. His applause also provokes a reaction from the
murderer that validates the father's gain and presence as a force with which to be reckoned"); id.
at 533 (stating that "a mother decided to mother her dead son by attending and becoming a
visible presence at every hearing held for the eight boys who killed him. She watched over her
son and his welfare by sitting in for the victim and making the court system, as well as the boys,
accountable to her").
233. Carrie A. Rentschler, Witnessing: US Citizenship and the Vicarious Experience of
Suffering, 26(2) MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC'Y 296, 297 (2004).
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proceedings. Peters notes that "[l]iveness serves as an assurance of access to truth and
authenticity," and that "'[b]eing there' matters since it avoids the ontological
depreciation of being a copy.. The
copy ...
...

is infinitely
repeatable;
the event,,234is
.
. ..

singular, and its witnesses are forever irreplaceable in their privileged relation to it.
The communicative qualities inherent in maintaining a participative presence at
legal proceedings are evident in the remarks of Oklahoma City bombing victims'
families and survivors, who attended not only to "see justice done" but also to
represent the murdered victims and to allow the jury to see that family members and
survivors very much cared about the outcome of the trial. Victims' families regarded
attendance at trial and execution as a "right" and fought uphill battles to be permitted
to attend the trial235 and to witness the execution. 236 Participant 1, a survivor who
retired in order to attend the trial stated that attendance communicated to the jury what
was at stake for the victims' families and survivors:
I think public pressure, on the court systems tends to yield a verdict sometimes
that represents what the majority of people want. These jurors are to be held
accountable for their decisions.... I think it's important to attend ... it's

important to show that urn, you, you were concerned about the outcome of the
237
thing and I think it does have an impact on it ....

Similarly, Participant 16 spoke of "just wanting to know that I was there 238
and a part of it
and was able to look him in the face, you know, and call him a creep.,
Victims' family members and survivors also consciously elected to attend the trial
out of a desire to be a visible presence in order to represent deceased victims or simply
to be there live as proceedings unfolded. An active presence symbolized that family
members and survivors derived something meaningful from the forms of closure that a
trial could accomplish, not that they looked to legal proceedings to expiate their grief.
They were aware that "reconciliation is not the goal of criminal trials except in the
most abstract sense," and that "[r]econstruction of a relationship, seeking to heal the
accused, or indeed, healing the rest of the community, are not the goals in any direct
sense." 239 They knew that "[t]he trial works in the key of formal justice, sounding
closure through a full and final hearing, a verdict, a sentence." 240 It was precisely these
adjudicative elements that they craved.
These individuals also made their participative presence felt at McVeigh's
execution. The remarks of victims' families and survivors illustrate how important it
was for individuals to attend the execution for several reasons: to witness the last stage
in the legal process, to remain involved through participation, and to see justice done.
Witnesses literally attend and attend to an execution on the basis of general

234. John Durham Peters, Witnessing, 23

MEDIA, CULTURE & Soc'Y 707, 718 (2001).
235. See Jody Lyned Madeira, Ties out ofBloodshed: CollectiveMemory, CulturalTrauma,
and the Prosecution and Execution of Timothy McVeigh, in DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS
INTERNATIONAL 131-32 (2007).
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communicative expectancies-the hope that an offender may apologize, the desire for
the offender to be aware of one's presence, a perception that seeing the offender die
will be meaningful. For example, Participant 25 attended out of a desire to see
McVeigh face-to-face:
I have not been able to see this guy face to face. I have watch[ed] him on TV, I've
watched him on closed-circuit. And I'm the type of guy that I need to see what is
going on. I'm hoping that if I can see his face maybe I can get some kind of idea
exactly who he is and what he thinks.24'
McVeigh's behavior during the execution was incredibly meaningful for
participants, who felt as if they could interpret his every gesture.242 For instance,
Participant 5's spouse stated, "I'm glad I saw him that close up and everything 'cause
' 243
The potential
that way I knew from his eyes and his expression what he was feeling.

potency of a communicative interaction between the offender and an execution witness
can be seen in the remarks of Participant 28:
[H]e started looking around the room. And I remember he met.., met me eye to
eye. And I... I mean Ijust... I'm sure Ijust went white and I had to turn around.
Ijust... I was like... it's like someone hadjust taken my breath away. In shock I
you know, I said244it was like looking at the devil eye to eye. It was just a horrible,
horrible feeling.

If anything, witnesses desired more communicative interaction. Anthony Scott,
another live execution witness, said in a media interview immediately following the
execution that "I wish that there might have been eye to eye contact, but he couldn't see
us. , 2 45 Similarly, Participant 28 remarked:

I would like for him to look at my face and know the pain that I knew he's caused.
And to see, you know, to see my daughter and to know that you know, you killed
my daughter and her baby. You killed them. You know, yeah, I wish246he could
have seen my face, because I saw his, I wish he could have seen mine.
In this vein, some witnesses wanted to send McVeigh one last message. Participant 25
wanted to communicate defiance back to McVeigh: "I wanted to see him when he was
in the chair, like that, and I wanted him to see me. Because I wanted him to know that
no matter what he did or didn't do, we were going to survive this thing and we would
be better afterwards., 247 Similarly, live witness and survivor Anthony Scott stated, "I

241. CNN Breaking News: Judge Denies Stay of Executionfor McVeigh, Appeal Expected

(CNN television broadcast June 6, 2001), available at http://transcripts.cnn.coml/
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242. See Madeira, Blood Relations, supra note 107, at 103-21.

243. Interview with Participant No. 5, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (July 2, 2005).
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wanted him to see me, to somehow let him know that you didn't break the spirit that
you thought you were going to break .... , 248
Moreover, two live witnesses brought in small photographs oftheir murdered loved
ones and held the photographs up against the glass during the execution. One of these
witnesses, Participant 29, describes this experience:
I was again lucky enough, I got in the front row and [another live witness] and I
had both had a picture.... She had her [child]'s picture and we put them right up
to the window. Not that he could see it. It was more symbolic and we had to do it
very discreetly because we had guards behind us. But yeah,
249 stuck a picture up
there so [deceased sibling's name] could watch it happen.
When asked whether it was as if the murdered sibling were witnessing, Participant 29
replied "Yeah, that's why I did it. Symbolically I felt that way ....
Engaging in intervention behavior may even entail a desire to meet the offender. A
recent feature story reported that nearly ninety percent of participants in a 5000-person
study wanted to "face their attackers": "The majority of people, survivors, want to
know why, for the offender to hear their pain and ultimately to be validated with their.
. apology." 251 A chance to meet with McVeigh would have been popular with family
members and survivors of the Oklahoma City bombing; eleven out of twenty-seven
interviewees wanted to meet with him, and another five were willing but were unsure
as to whether such a meeting would have been productive because of McVeigh's stoic
demeanor. Participants' reasons for meeting with McVeigh included desires to know
"why" McVeigh had committed the bombing, to confront him with the extent of the
damage he had wrought, to see McVeigh in person and/or outside of legal proceedings,
and to learn something from being in his presence.
In summary, a communicative theory of closure more fully explicates this concept's
dimensions, illustrating its reflective intrapersonal and interventive interpersonal
dimensions. A communicative theory of closure also reveals that closure is far broader
than grieving behavior, and that it is facilitated not by the white-hot ire of vengeance
but by more temperate reflection and strategic action.
C. Refraining the Debate over Victim Impact Testimony as Communicative
A more conventional participation method is providing victim impact testimony at
sentencing. Victim impact testimony is itself on trial within legal academia. The debate
it has engendered illustrates the conflicts that can arise when public, juridical standards
are brought to bear upon private familial or domestic experiences, as in resolving child
custody disputes between the State and family, or examining racial narratives of
oppression. 22522 The communicative model aids in assessing the propriety of victim

248. Pam Belluck, The McVeigh Execution: The Scene; Calm at Execution Site and Silence
by Mc Veigh Prove Unsettlingfor Some, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2001, at A27.
249. Interview with Participant No. 29, supra note 163.
250. Id.
251. Confronting the Killer of Your Loved One, CNN.CoM, http://www.cnn.com/
2008/LIVING/personal/07/22/o.confronting.the.killer/index.html.
252. See OLVER, supra note 186, at 94.
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impact testimony in capital legal proceedings-ascertaining whether and why it
violates defendants' rights and marks an improper conflation of legal and therapeutic
objectives.
The subjective, passionate testimony a victim impact witness lends to proceedings
immediately marks the victim impact witness as atypical in legal proceedings. As
Peters notes:
Legal rules prefer a mechanical witness. A witness, for instance, may not offer
an opinion ... but may only describe the facts of what was seen....

In the preference for the dumb witness lies a distant origin of both scientific
and journalistic ideas of objectivity .... The objective witness is very different
from the survivor, whose witness lies in mortal engagement with the story told.253
Testifying to the harms that a loved one's murder has wrought illustrates the
communicative tensions inherent in narrating life experiences to others-one can never
precisely translate experience into words, and cannot foresee what meanings will be
ascribed to such testimony. As Peters notes, "Witnessing presupposes a discrepancy
between the ignorance of one person and the knowledge of another .... It always
involves an epistemological gap whose bridging is always fraught with difficulty. No
transfusion of consciousness is possible. 254 Yet, the hope of aiding others to
appreciate the victim's nature and the anguish and horror of her death is very important
for family members, who may regard victim impact testimony as a way to represent the
victim and to ensure "justice." Thus:
Survivors may .

.

. maintain that they represent not only themselves as the

secondary victims of crime but also the mute, dead, and sometimes watchful
primary victims as well; and their accounts were turned inward and outward, not
only towards and for the victim, but also towards the world.... They had a strong
moral purpose in testifying: believing, as other255survivors believed, that "to bear
witness is to take responsibility for the truth".
In this way, victims are moved "[f]rom anonymity to embodiment, from absence to
presence," allowing victim impact statements to "become[] a vehicle for
resurrecting
2 6
the dead and allowing them to speak as their killers are being judged., 1
Victim impact testimony is not only a statement but also a performance, comprised
both of the "facts" of loss and their delivery. A victim impact statement resurrects
victims and embodies victims' family members in bodies of text or flesh. Victim
impact statements illustrate the politics of bodily visibility; a victim impact statement
that is delivered to the court on paper renders its provider visible in different and less
effective ways than a statement that is delivered orally. Because empathy for the

253. Peters, supra note 234, at 716.
254. Id. at 710.
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sufferings of another results in part from similarities between oneself and that other,
physical appearance may be a key factor in its formation. Empathy is perceived to
invite prejudice, and so the inclusion of human bodies becomes a paramount concern,
particularly when a victim is white and a defendant is black. Thus, a body of flesh is
dangerous in ways that a body of text is not. This suggests that the body is a mediator
between self and other, between jurors and family members; its skin is a permeable
boundary for emotion and experience.
It is possible to regard several key points in the debate over the propriety of victim
impact testimony as disputes over the communicative nature of victim impact
testimony-whether or not it invites a jury response in the form of a death sentence.
This, in turn, compels an investigation into the monologic and dialogic qualities of
victim impact statements.
1. Victim Impact Testimony as Monologue
It may at first be strange to think of victim impact testimony as communicative, if
one's idea of communication involves back-and-forth exchange; such testimony
appears to have little or no dialogic component. There is no requirement that
communicative interaction be dialogic, however; communicative actions such as
imparting or transferring information can be one-way, or monologic. Moreover, the
belief that communication involves mutual exchange can stymie and confound
communicative theorizing, since "[m]uch of culture is not necessarily dyadic, mutual,
or interactive. '' 258 Peters notes that "the end of conversation and the call for refreshed
dialogue alike miss the virtues inherent in nonreciprocal forms of action and
culture." 259 In actuality, "we are surrounded with communication situations that are
fundamentally interpretive .... ,260
Peters asserts that "one dominant branch" of communicative meaning is the act of
imparting information, quite different "from any notion of a dialogic or interactive
process. ,,261 Imparting "suggests belonging to a social body via an expressive act that
requires no response or recognition., 262 The act of partaking is, in and of itself, a
gesture of inclusion. For instance, in the publication of a scholarly article or the posting
of a "communication" in the sense of a "message or notice," there is no expectation of
communicative exchange, but "some sort of audience, however vague or dispersed, is
implied. 2 63 Similarly, the "notion of communication as the transfer of physical entities,
such as ideas, thoughts, or meanings" is relevant. 2 4
According to Payne v. Tennessee, victim impact testimony exemplifies the "harm"
done through murder, and thus is evidence that the jury should properly consider in its

257. See generally Jody Lyned Madeira, Lashing Reason to the Mast: Understanding
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sentencing deliberations. 265 Arguably, then, victim impact testimony is part of a larger
body of evidence that is transmitted to jurors to be evaluated in sentencing
determinations. Viewing victim impact testimony as non-dialogic, it would be
dangerous to believe that such statements in and of themselves compel a jury
"response" of death. Rather, such statements are gestures that reflect the jury's
assessment of all evidence, including victim impact statements.266
Other communicative parallels to non-dialogic victim impact testimony exist. In
certain communicative situations, an answer cannot be anticipated, and "control over
turn taking is restricted to one end of the transaction," as in "[a] radio show broadcast
at 2:00 A.M., an SOS in a bottle cast into the sea, a personal ad in the 'agony columns'
of the newspaper... all speak, as it were, into the void, or at least to those who have
ears to hear. They await completion of the loop." 267 A victim's relative writing an
impact statement faces the opposite task of a judge who seeks to interpret the
Constitution, because the judge is actually in a similar position to members of a capital
jury weighing victim impact evidence; the relative anguishes over how to get her
message across, "fret[ting] about how to get [her] 'message' across the gap," while the
judge and jury must discover how to read texts that lack specific interpretive mandates
or assessments of relevancy or worth.268
The notion that victim impact testimony gives victims' families "avoice" further
illustrates the one-sided nature of this communicative endeavor. It reflects a limited
view of victim participation-by a witness who is a vocal presence, delivering a
statement that is most often left unquestioned by a defense counsel who does not wish
to appear hostile and inhuman. The concept of giving victims a "voice," however wellintentioned, is also rather paternalistic; victim's families already have voices, and very
much wish to use them. What is provided is not a voice, but the inclusion of that voice
in a meaningful forum. This voice does not speak to garner a reply, but speaks to bear
witness, to deliver a message, inviting the possibility for empathic interpretation.
The absence of a dialogic component to victim impact testimony goes hand-in-hand
with the notion that the victim impact witness is not a person to whom it is easy to
respond, and thus explains the alienation of this individual. It may at first appear that
bringing victims' family members into the courtroom to testify to the consequences of

265. 501 U.S. 808, 825-26 (1991).
266. Victims who are giving victim impact testimony must be told that their statements are
just one form of evidence that the jury must consider in determining an appropriate sentence.
Erez reports that, in an Australian study of victim impact testimony involving victims of many
different types of crimes:
[A] lmost three-quarters of victims who stated they provided VIS [Victim Impact
Statement] material expected the VIS to have an impact on the sentence. Less than
half of them felt that their input had an effect on the sentence. For about a third of
the victims who stated they provided VIS material, expectations concerning the
effect of VIS on sentencing went unfulfilled.
Edna Erez, Leigh Roeger & Michael O'Connell, Victim Impact Statements in South Australia,
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the victim's loss is an inclusive gesture, not an alienating one. But the status ofvictims'
family members as co-victims or survivors is what is profoundly isolating. Though this
role is what gains them inclusion, it is also what holds them apart. The jurisprudential
alienation of the victims' family mirrors their lonely status in other social forums as
well. No one else can understand or fully appreciate what they are enduring, and so
these individuals are temporarily or permanently kept "at a distance from everyday
life" not only because "[tihe codtaminating power of association with murder ... is
especially ancient and frightening," but because family members may not be able to
match others' expectations for concluding their grieving processes on a certain
timeline. 269 Thus, "[h]omicide survivors tend to feel they are a group apart, a special
minority, quite unlike anyone else," and find that they are "treated as importantly
different. 270 Some victims' family members may take a sort of pride in their alienation
and the uniqueness of their perspective; for them, the communicative value of victim
impact testimony lies in its delivery and interpretive potential, not in its dialogic
capacity. Victims' families appreciate having the last word on loss.
The nature of victim impact testimony itself further alienates those who deliver it.
Its propriety is controversial, reaffirming the liminal status of the victims' families who
create and enunciate these statements. One is not entirely sure where these individuals
and their messages belong. Moreover, victim impact testimony may not always be
chopped-up in its delivery, elicited through direct and cross-examination methods, but
may be read as a whole narrative statement. Like its manner of utterance, the victim
impact statement is itself distinct, unlike other forms of evidence. It offers those in the
courtroom insight into a different kind of harm, and establishes surreal linkages to dead
victims through the words of their living representatives.
Nonetheless, research suggests that victim impact testimony does provide relief or
catharsis. Erez reports that the results of an Australian victim impact study suggest that
[a]lmost half of the victims who stated that they provided VIS [Victim Impact
Statement] material felt relieved or satisfied after providing the information, and
for the other half, providing VIS material did not make any difference. Only a
small number of victims (6 per cent) were upset or disturbed by this experience.
The overwhelming majority of victims who provided information stated they
wanted or agreed to the VIS being used in sentencing. Practically all these
respondents felt that if they were a victim again they would want a VIS presented
"
in court.27
'
Victim dissatisfaction stemmed not from the delivery of the victim impact statement
but from unrealized expectations concerning the effect of the testimony on
sentencing-when victims ingenuously believed that the victim impact statement was
dialogic, and expected a certain "response. ' 272 Thus, a communicative model actually
explains victim dissatisfaction with victim impact testimony-the inaccurate
expectation that a dialogic communicative model would apply.
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2. Victim Impact Testimony as Dialogue
Alternatively, however, victim impact testimony could be seen as an attempt to
compel a response from the jury or defendant. For at the same time that a relative
delivers victim impact testimony to jurors who are likely empathic, she is
simultaneously confronting the very individual who is the source of her misery.
Several scholars have described the act of witnessing as involving the possibility of
address and response; a witness gives testimony to another with the intent of assisting
that individual to appreciate a traumatic event, thereby rendering that other a witness in
turn.273 According to Laub, the act of witnessing requires the presence of an inner
witness, or a self-consciousness of the need to craft a testimony, and an external
witness, someone to whom one imparts testimony; other scholars refer to similar
concepts such as "inner dialogue." 274 Whereas the inner witness is set up in "dialogic
relations with others, [and] necessary to give the subject a sense of itself as agent," an
external witness is that other to which the inner witness addresses her statements.275
This external witness is necessarily empathic. The presence of an inner witness
compels the existence of an external witness, and vice versa; "[w]ithout an external
witness, we cannot develop or sustain the internal witness necessary for the ability to
interpret and represent our experience ... ,276 Thus, the dialogue between an inner
witness (a victim's family member) and an external witness (a juror) is mutually coconstructive.
The concept of the inner witness incorporates both reflexive and interventive
closure behaviors; reflexivity denotes a family member's internal attempts to
comprehend and contextualize developments in a murder case and determine next
steps, whereas intervention consists of a family member's strategic selection of "next
steps" and their accomplishment. Legal proceedings facilitate interventive behaviors by
helping family members to build new dialogic connections with others, enabling
reconstruction on the premise that social construction enables self construction. Legal
scholars do not find the concept of "inner witness" troubling; instead, their concerns lie
with the identity of the "external witness" and the building of dialogic connections in
capital proceedings. The jury as an empathic analyst is an unsettling one, for the jury is
charged to respond to the defendant's crime, and not to victims' family members. Thus,
the question arises whether juries can, in propriety, serve as external empathic
witnesses.
Because witnessing compels response, the path to answering this query lies, as it
does for a monologic conception of victim impact testimony, in determining what sort
of response a dialogic victim impact statement compels. Two jury behaviors may be
construed as a "response" to victim impact testimony. First, the jury's response could
be the act of considering the victim impact statement in sentencing deliberations, on
the premise that these remarks reflect relevant and significant concerns and therefore
merit inclusion. Second, the jury could respond by recommending a specific sentence.
If the response is in fact the final sentencing recommendation, rather than the
incorporation of family members' concerns into deliberations, then victim impact
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testimony must be omitted in order to safeguard defendants' rights. If the jury responds
solely by considering family members' concerns, however, then the prejudicial or
problematic effects of victim impact statements are less certain because juries
ostensibly do not sentence in response to such testimony. Thus, the debate is one of
dialogic ethics, concerning the propriety and efficacy of various forms of articulation
and response.
However, at the same time that a relative is delivering impact testimony to jurors,
she is also addressing the defendant. The defendant is scarcely likely to be an empathic
external witness, and so one might think that confronting him might imperil the
victim's inner witness, undermining personal resolve to provide victim impact
testimony. Research shows, however, that victims' families probably long to provoke
some reaction from the defendant.277 In addition, it might be easier for some victims'
relatives to give victim impact testimony if they are told that they are addressing the
court. This renders the confrontation of the defendant almost accidental, a consequence
of his courtroom presence. Framing victim impact testimony as a statement to the jury
and not to the defendant might reduce anxiety as it (at least nominally) substitutes a
nonthreatening party for the defendant and casts the courtroom as a supportive and safe
environment. Rendering this confrontation implicit is not likely to lessen its effect,
however, because victims' families are acutely aware that the defendant is present and
will hear their words. Relatives may also legitimately engage in nonverbal dialogue
with the offender by delivering an otherwise appropriate victim impact statement (e.g.,
one not linguistically addressed to the defendant) while looking primarily at the
defendant instead of the judge or jury. Thus, most may deliver statements that are
either partially or wholly designed to provoke a response, emotional or otherwise, from
the defendant. This anticipation of a response from the defendant is necessarily
dialogic, rendering the courtroom a confrontational forum, however covert.
CONCLUSION: PROVIDING AN OPENING FOR CLOSURE

Opposition to the pursuit of closure through criminal proceedings is not based on
disapproval of closure in and of itself, but on discomfort with appeasing victims in
criminal proceedings where the first priority must be rigorously safeguarding
defendants' rights. Law structures the legal forums in which victims speak, and it
therefore determines a trial's narrative focus. Until 1991, when the admissibility of
victim impact testimony as a matter of state law was allowed by the Supreme Court in
Payne,one central narrative purpose of a criminal trial was to publicize the defendant's
private stories, such as accounts of behavior and motive, for judicial examination.
Victims' family members' stories, however, were kept private. Recent expansions in
storytelling agency reflect changes in stakeholding, not ownership. Without ceding the
floor entirely to victims, law is recognizing its own subjectivity by according weight to
other subjectivities, such as by redefining "harm" to include injury to victims' family
members. 278 Accompanying these changes is an uneasy sense that victims' participation
threatens to contaminate proceedings, undoing the rule of law. The privileging of
victims' voices necessitates that we must continually grapple with the propriety of
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when and how these voices should speak, since the question of "if' these voices may
speak is, at least as of now, resolved.
This article has endeavored to deconstruct some of the most powerful contemporary
myths about why and how victims seek closure in capital proceedings, decoupling
closure from grief and vengeance and exploring its links to restoration of control and to
accountability. A more informed understanding should lead to the conclusion that
victims have much to gain from involvement in legal proceedings, and victim
participation is not inherently undesirable. If anything, demonstrating how closure does
not revolve around the resolution of grief and the pursuit of vengeance brings victims'
goals in line with those of criminal adjudication. As Hoffman asserts,
[T]he victims' rights movement has reminded us that crime victims are not like the
rest of us; instead, they rightfully occupy a special place within the criminal justice
system. Their opinions about such fundamental issues as discretionary charging
decisions, plea bargains, and sentences should matter to the system, even if similar
opinions expressed by the rest of us do not. The voices of crime victims (or their
survivors) should perhaps be muted, in order to prevent arbitrary or irrational
decisions, but those voices should not be completely silenced.279
Moreover, closure is so wedded to death penalty jurisprudence that it would be
difficult if not impossible at this point to strip capital proceedings of closure
implications, even in the face of a Supreme Court opinion overruling Payne.For better
or worse, then, these therapeutic expectations are now part of the cultural expectations
surrounding the death penalty. Arguing over what law's relationship to closure should
or should not be is less effective when the culture is saturated with closure concerns.
Instead, more empirical research is needed to bolster current claims about the effects of
victim participation in capital proceedings. Significantly, a number of scholars contend
that victim impact testimony in general does not provide satisfaction to victims, but cite
to a study by Davis and Smith analyzing statements written by victims but read by
court officials, not statements read aloud by victims. Davis and Smith explicitly state
that the results would likely be very different for victims who read their own statements
aloud: "Victim allocution-allowing victims to make oral statements to the court at
sentencing-might offer a more effective way to promote victim satisfaction through
participation. A study of the effects of a California allocution statute suggested that
most victims who spoke expressed positive feelings about the experience of
allocution. 2 s°
At the same time, by maintaining a monopoly on trial and punishment, the State
establishes legal proceedings as the only source of many crucial elements of
reconstruction in the aftermath of murder, such as information and accountability. Even
victim services, the forms of assistance with which family members are likely to be
most familiar and willing to seek out, are most often affiliated with prosecutors'
offices, and are even housed in the same office area. Victims' families are therefore
encouraged to seek closure from legal proceedings not only by cultural expectations
but also through the practical arrangements of the criminal justice system.
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Fortunately, therapeutic concerns are not alien to the law; Bibas, for instance,
compares the provision of remedies in personal injury cases to victim participation in
criminal proceedings: "Just as society is willing to bear some of the cost of accident
victims' physical healing, it should support and fund crime victims' emotional and
psychological healing through transparent, participatory criminal procedure." 281 Up
until now, however, most scholars have equated victim participation with victim impact
testimony. But if victim impact testimony is thought to be problematic because of its
potential to infringe on defendants' rights, then the answer is not to oppose all forms of
victim participation, but to find new opportunities that do not carry the same risks.
Accommodating victims' closure needs is workable; fortunately, the ways in which
people seek closure in the context of capital proceedings are much less varied than
their definitions of the concept. While some family members will surely find certain
opportunities more meaningful than others, legal officials are not obliged to
continuously invent and implement new ways to accommodate them. There are only a
finite number of ways in which family members can seek closure through legal
proceedings-accountability,
confrontation, observation, information, and
participation. Thus, officials will merely have to ensure that victims' families have
access to a variety of participatory opportunities, including attendance, victim impact
testimony, post-sentence allocution, victim-offender mediation, and execution
witnessing. Of course, not all of these options will be available in every case.
First, changes must be made in existing opportunities for victim participation. For
instance, policy makers and legal practitioners must prove that they are serious about
promoting closure, and not the death penalty, by allowing all victims' family
members-even those who are against the death penalty-to give victim impact
statements. It is sometimes debatable whether the popularity of closure stems from
political or altruistic concerns. Praising closure opportunities for their reconstructive
benefits while ignoring the ways in which they can be politically manipulated actually
subverts or altogether extinguishes their healing potential. In addition, research shows
that victim impact statements are rarely given. It appears that most victims never know
of their right to address the court in this manner; thus more efforts must be made to
educate victims on their entitlements. 282 States can also increase opportunities for
victim-offender mediation in the capital murder context. Bibas notes that "[m]ost
victims want to tell offenders how their crimes affected them and hear offenders
answer their questions about the offense." 283 Hearing an offender apologize is
especially crucial; "[v]ictims want face-to-face apologies so that they can understand
why their crimes happened
to them, release their anger, and regain a sense of control
' 284
and self-esteem.
It is also necessary to facilitate closure by implementing new opportunities that will
not affect defendants' legal interests. Post-sentence victim allocution 285 would provide
family members with an opportunity to address defendants after sentence is passed-

281.
282.
283.
284.

Bibas,supranote 11,at964.
See id.
Bibas & Bierschbach, supranote 226, at 138.
Id.
285. See, e.g., TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc.ANN.art. 42.03(l)(b) (2006 & Supp. 2008) (providing
for post-sentence victim allocution).
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something which many, if not most, victims ardently desire.286 Though the mechanics
of this argument are for another article, post-sentence allocution, like victim impact
testimony, fulfills families' needs to bear witness to murderous loss. Such statements
would not automatically become part of the trial record; states could determine whether
their transcription was optional, at the election of the trial judge, or prohibited. Ideally,
though delivered in open court, post-sentence allocution statements would be
addressed to the defendant, in contrast to victim impact testimony, which is delivered
to the court.
In summary, given the nature of victims' families' losses, closure will continue to be
an important issue in criminal proceedings that must be carefully understood and
cautiously pursued. Though legal scholars' reactions imply that it is problematic or
unworkable because it places the therapeutic burden of healing victims on criminal
proceedings, jeopardizing and potentially superseding its primary purpose of
adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant, victims' families learn that
comprehending and contextualizing a murder's aftermath must occur from the inside
out, and do not look to a trial or even an execution to terminate all of their grieving.
After all, they must live in and with the victim's loss, regardless of what legal
developments occur. Hence, victims' families are actually rather astute and selective in
appraising forums for their closure potential, and they rely on legal proceedings to
facilitate some foundational premises of closure, such as information and
accountability. They may believe, however, that closure is suspended until certain legal
proceedings are over, or that it is contingent upon a certain outcome such as a guilty
verdict. Thus, the process of closure does not mandate that the criminal justice system
heal victims, but that victims heal themselves. Criminal law must merely provide them
with footholds to do so.

286. See id.

